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NOTES
WHITHER FAIRNESS?
IN SEARCH OF A JURISDICTIONAL TEST
AFTER J. MCINTYRE MACHINERY V. NICASTRO
Peter R. Bryce*
In 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on the issue of personal
jurisdiction over alien corporations in products liability cases. J. McIntyre
Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro was the Court’s first statement on the issue in
twenty-four years. The opinion, handed down almost ten years after the
injury that gave rise to the litigation, could not command a majority of the
Justices. Writing for a plurality, Justice Kennedy set forth a strict standard
that required that a manufacturer’s products be specifically targeted at a
given forum state for jurisdiction to be proper.
This Note argues that, while Kennedy’s opinion did not necessarily
violate the letter of jurisdictional doctrine—for in reality, there is no
discernible letter—it violated the spirit. In analyzing the origins,
development, and application of personal jurisdiction over the centuries,
this Note concludes that the current palette of jurisdictional tests is not
sufficient to meet the demands of fairness in cases like Nicastro. Using
simple tort concepts as analogues, this Note advances a new test capable of
doing justice without violating due process.
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INTRODUCTION
On October 11, 2001, Robert Nicastro showed up at his job at a scrap
metal plant in New Jersey. 1 In the usual course of his work, calamity
struck: his hand got caught in a shearing machine, and he lost four fingers.2
He felt that the machine had been poorly designed, and sued in New Jersey
state court to recover for his injuries. 3 Ultimately, his case made its way to
the U.S. Supreme Court. 4
The issue driving the litigation had nothing to do with Nicastro’s hand.
Nobody ever asked whether the machine was, in fact, negligently designed,
or even dangerous. Instead, the Supreme Court decided that Nicastro had
gone about the process all wrong: he had brought the case in the wrong
1.
2.
3.
4.

See Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am., Ltd., 987 A.2d 575, 577 (N.J. 2010).
See id.
See id. at 577–79.
J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
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court! 5 Because the company that made the machine—J. McIntyre
Machinery, Ltd.—did not have an office in New Jersey, and had not
specifically targeted the machine for sale in that state, it could not be sued
in New Jersey, even if the defect caused serious and irreparable injury
there. 6
This Note questions why courts are reluctant to hold foreign and alien
corporations amenable to suit in jurisdictions where their products cause
serious injury. 7 To some, it may be an intuitively agreeable notion that a
farmer from Florida should not be forced to defend himself in an Alaska
state court simply at the whim of the plaintiff, if the farmer has never had
any contact whatsoever with Alaska. 8 But can that intuition also be
credibly extended to Nicastro’s case? Is it simply unconstitutionally
inconvenient to fly back and forth from Tallahassee to Juneau to defend
oneself? 9 Is remote litigation an unconstitutional surprise to the luckless
farmer? 10 Or does our federal system demand that states avoid meddling in
the affairs of far-flung jurisdictions without a good reason? 11
It seems fair to allow Nicastro to pursue redress for his injuries in the
state in which they occurred. Reluctant to adopt such a position, the
5. See id. at 2790–91.
6. See id.
7. For the purposes of this Note, the term “foreign” shall be used to identify U.S.
entities in states outside the forum asserting jurisdiction. The term “alien” shall be used to
identify entities in nations outside those bounds. Because “substantially the same rules of
personal jurisdiction have been applied both to domestic and alien defendant corporations,”
these distinctions are purely semantic herein. Matthew D. Richardson, The Outer Limits of In
Personam Jurisdiction over Alien Corporations: The National Contacts Theory, 16 GEO.
WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 637, 637 (1982).
8. See, e.g., Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2790 (grounding a jurisdictional test in this
hypothetical).
9. See Oxford First Corp. v. PNC Liquidating Corp., 372 F. Supp. 191, 203–04 (E.D.
Pa. 1974); Maryellen Fullerton, Constitutional Limits on Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction
in the Federal Courts, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 38–39 (1984) (noting that the Supreme Court
considers inconvenience and unreasonableness of lawsuits in distant forums relevant factors
in determining the legitimacy of jurisdiction in federal cases). But see Allan R. Stein, Styles
of Argument and Interstate Federalism in the Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 65 TEX. L. REV.
689, 704–05 (1987) (“[C]onvenience has played a peripheral role” in determining the
legitimacy of subjecting defendants to suit in distant forums).
10. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (“The
[Constitution] . . . gives a degree of predictability to the legal system that allows potential
defendants to structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that
conduct will and will not render them liable to suit.”).
11. See id. at 294 (“[E]ven if the forum State is the most convenient location for
litigation, the Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate federalism, may
sometimes act to divest the State of its power to render a valid judgment.”); see also
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1878) (finding a violation of the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment where a court “determine[s] the personal rights and obligations
of parties over whom [a] court has no jurisdiction”). But see Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v.
Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702–03 n.10 (1982) (noting that the Due
Process Clause does not mention federalism; protecting parties from far-flung adjudicatory
proceedings is, rather, an “individual liberty interest”). The Bauxites Court also observed
that, because a defendant can waive the defense of personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(h), the right arguably inheres in the individual who can dispose of it,
and not in the several states who wish to preserve their adjudicatory interest. Id. at 704.
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Supreme Court has made references to federalism12 and a defendant’s
purposeful conduct aimed at the forum state13 as key elements of
jurisdictional doctrine. The empathetic desire to provide adequate relief to
injured plaintiffs in the forum of their injury is not always sufficient to
justify an assertion of jurisdiction.14
With respect to corporations, the Supreme Court has held that, for a
corporation to be sued in a state not its own, the exercise of jurisdiction
must be reasonable. 15 In J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, the
Court’s most recent foray into personal jurisdiction, 16 Justice Kennedy
concluded that it was not reasonable to subject an English corporation to a
New Jersey state court’s jurisdiction, even though: (1) the corporation
commissioned an agent to sell its metal-shearing machines in the United
States; (2) the corporation’s representatives had attended annual
conventions in several states to market its machines to U.S. buyers; (3) at
least one of these machines wound up in New Jersey; and (4) one of these
machines severed four fingers from Robert Nicastro’s right hand. 17
This is not the case of a Floridian farmer suddenly being forced to fly to
Juneau to defend himself simply because he sold an orange to a distributor
in Tallahassee. 18 A New Jersey resident has four fewer fingers because of
something that happened in his home state. These missing digits were
allegedly due to the negligence of an alien corporation.19 This Note
concludes that an instinct, based on fairness, to allow a New Jersey court to
exercise jurisdiction over J. McIntyre is legitimate, reasonable, and
constitutional. 20
12. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 293–94.
13. See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
14. See infra Part I.C.
15. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292. Reasonableness considers not only
the inconveniences to and burden on the defendant, but also the “forum State’s interest in
adjudicating the dispute; the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective
relief . . . the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of
controversies; and the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental
substantive social policies.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
16. 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). Nicastro was decided by a plurality opinion on June 27,
2011. On the same day, the Court handed down a unanimous decision in Goodyear Dunlop
Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011). In Goodyear, the Court invalidated
the exercise of general jurisdiction over a corporation, that is, jurisdiction based purely on
the systematic presence of a defendant in a given forum. Id. at 2851. This Note is concerned
only with specific jurisdiction: the exercise of judicial authority based on a discernible act,
committed by a defendant, and related to the controversy. See Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2788;
see also Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A
Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1144–47 (1966).
17. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2785–86.
18. But see id. at 2790 (expressing concern that if the defendant corporation were held
amenable to suit in Nicastro, then an owner of a “small Florida farm” would also be
amenable to suit in Alaska if she entered into an agreement with a large-scale distributor
who sold her products in all fifty states).
19. See Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am., Ltd., 987 A.2d 575, 577 (N.J. 2010).
20. Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Introduction to HENRY M. HART,
JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND
APPLICATION OF LAW, at cxiii (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994)
(“When Henry Hart taught ‘Federal Courts’ for the last time, during the Spring Term of
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Part I of this Note tracks the evolution of personal jurisdiction from its
origins to the modern day. This history will discuss the inconsistencies in
the doctrine, which leave it open to interpretation and refinement as new
fact patterns present themselves. Part II analyzes the Nicastro decision, and
argues that the Supreme Court missed an opportunity to clarify the doctrine
and achieve a just result for all parties. Part III proposes a standard of
jurisdictional analysis that uses principles of tort law as models through
which jurisdiction may be more cogently and fairly applied.
I. TWO CENTURIES OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Part I explores the winding road that jurisdictional doctrine has traveled.
It begins by discussing the support for understanding personal jurisdiction
as a constitutional mandate. It then explores various other justifications that
the Supreme Court has used to resolve interstate jurisdictional disputes.
Part I concludes by analyzing the “stream of commerce” doctrine, an
analytical tool that courts use to resolve jurisdictional cases where a
plaintiff sues a corporation based upon the existence of its product in a
given state, despite the absence of the corporation’s actual presence.
A. Protecting Defendants from Unreasonable Power
Maria lives in New York State. Duncan, from Seattle, sues in
Washington state court to collect on a debt. Maria might be tempted to sit
comfortably in Albany and spurn Duncan’s attempt to sue her three
thousand miles away. However, if she fails to appear in court, a default
judgment will be entered against her, which will prevent her from
challenging the merits of the case at a later date. If and when Duncan seeks
to collect, Maria can only launch a collateral attack on the issue of
jurisdiction. 21 Once a decision is rendered in Washington (or any other
state), New York is compelled to recognize it as valid. This is because
Article IV, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution mandates that the judicial
proceedings in specific states be given “full faith and credit” in the several
states. 22

1965, he brought into class the Supreme Court’s opinion in Hamm v. City of Rock Hill. The
Court applied the just-enacted Civil Rights Act of 1964 to abate Southern prosecutions of
sit-in demonstrators. Hart stated the facts and relevant authorities, including a federal statute
creating a presumption against finding abatement of prosecutions by new statutes. It was
apparent . . . that the decision was about to be analytically dissected. But, rather than
launching into the sort of devastating critique of which he was capable, Hart paused and
reflected to himself, his eyes focused on his reprint of the Court’s opinion. The class
stopped for thirty breathless seconds. Finally, Hart looked up at the class and said:
‘Sometimes, sometimes, you just have to do the right thing.’”).
21. See Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 706
(1982).
22. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; see also Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481, 483–85
(1813) (holding that specific state court judgments must be given conclusive effect, and not
merely evidentiary effect, in other states); ROBERT C. CASAD, JURISDICTION IN CIVIL ACTIONS
2-3 to 2-4 (1983).
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But it certainly does not seem right to bind Maria to a Washington
judgment if she has never even been to Washington in the first place. The
doctrine of personal jurisdiction serves to protect Maria, and all those
similarly situated, from litigation in states with which they have no contact
whatsoever. 23
The Supreme Court first used the term “personal jurisdiction” in an
opinion finding that foreign nations share concurrent jurisdiction with the
United States when a crime is committed by an American on a private
foreign vessel. 24 In support of this proposition, the Court did not cite the
Constitution, but turned to Emmerich de Vattel’s The Law of Nations,
published in 1758, as a governing authority on matters of international
personal jurisdiction.25 Not until fifty-nine years later did the Court first
articulate a purely constitutional basis for personal jurisdiction.26 At the
outset, jurisdictional restraint had its origins in international policy, and not
in the Constitution. 27
Personal jurisdiction is therefore a doctrine often explained through the
use of hypotheticals with results that seem fair. 28 From its inception, the
propriety of the result, and not necessarily the method of arriving at it, has
been the relevant jurisdictional inquiry. 29
Early critics of broad jurisdictional reach expressed concern that the Full
Faith and Credit Clause could lead to improper results, as an unbridled
system of several state judiciaries could unfairly subject foreign defendants
to litigation in states “unconnected” to the underlying controversy. 30 The
Supreme Court addressed this concern in D’Arcy v. Ketchum, an 1850 case
that announced the right of non-resident defendants not to be subject to
unanticipated litigation in states where they were not present and had no
contacts. 31
23. See CASAD, supra note 22, at 2-5 to 2-6.
24. See United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 621 (1818).
25. Id. at 621 nn.d–e; see also GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL
CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 78 (4th ed. 2007) (early U.S. courts and
commentators looked to international law and comity as a basis for jurisdictional principles).
26. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1878); see infra Part I.B.
27. There is evidence that, with respect to state court jurisdiction over international
defendants, the framers agreed that jurisdiction over aliens was a prudential rather than
constitutional matter. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 485 (Alexander Hamilton) (Bantam
Classic ed., 2003) (“So great a proportion of the cases in which foreigners are parties involve
national questions, that it is by far most safe and most expedient to refer all those in which
they are concerned to the national tribunals.”). If jurisdiction is a prudential matter, it is
perhaps best to leave it in the hands of judges, whose experience in balancing close
jurisdictional questions will obtain more just results than rigid doctrinal analysis. See
RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 516–17 (6th ed. 2009) (doctrines that are arguably prudential or
constitutional benefit from an evolving common law supported by judicial expertise in
procedure); infra Part III.B.
28. See infra notes 173, 208 (Supreme Court Justices using hypotheticals to explain their
jurisdictional tests).
29. See infra notes 120, 229 and accompanying text (a test based on fairness).
30. Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481, 485–86 (1813) (Johnson, J., dissenting).
31. See 52 U.S. (11 How.) 165, 175–76 (1850) (holding that the Full Faith and Credit
Clause did not bind defendants to a state’s judgment when they were neither present in the
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B. Judicial Developments in the Doctrine
This section follows the Supreme Court’s evolution from a strict
jurisdictional standard to a more permissive analysis based on fairness. It
begins with a case in which jurisdiction was seen purely as a matter of
actual presence. 32 It then analyzes the Court’s decision to relax that
standard in order to achieve more just results.
It concludes by
demonstrating the doctrinal confusion that resulted from a rule whose
origins are uncertain and inconsistently cited.
1. Pennoyer v. Neff
The right of non-resident defendants to be safe from litigation in states
with which they did not have any contact, first articulated in D’Arcy, was
affirmed by the landmark case of Pennoyer v. Neff. 33 Pennoyer held that a
person who is not physically present in a state simply cannot be subject to
that state’s adjudicatory power. 34 Perhaps because of the “power”-based
origins of this rule, 35 Justice Field found a constitutional basis for it,
declaring that “proceedings in a court of justice to determine the personal
rights and obligations of parties over whom that court has no jurisdiction do
not constitute due process of law.” 36 The Court applied the Pennoyer rule
to corporations in 1915, finding that the Due Process Clause would not
permit suit against a corporation that had no presence whatsoever in the

adjudicating state nor served with process); see also Galpin v. Page, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 350,
367 (1873) (“The tribunals of one State have no jurisdiction over the persons of other States
unless found within their territorial limits; they cannot extend their process into other States,
and any attempt of the kind would be treated . . . as an act of usurpation . . . .”). But see
Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404, 406–08 (1855) (holding that it was not
unreasonable to bind an Indiana corporation to an Ohio court’s decision when that
corporation had appointed an agent to work in Ohio).
32. The physical presence requirement was, at first, rooted in the physical power of a
state to bring a civil defendant under its control by actual arrest in order to subject him to
now-antiquated procedural norms. See CASAD, supra note 22, at 2-10 to 2-11.
33. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
34. See id. at 723–24. Pennoyer also explained that jurisdiction over property is
different from jurisdiction over a person. Id. When a plaintiff’s claim is related to a
defendant’s property, and that defendant is not present in the state, the property in question
may be attached as part of a default judgment even when the defendant is not personally
found within the state. Id.
35. See supra note 32; see also infra note 47 and accompanying text.
36. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733. But see Ronan E. Degnan & Mary Kay Kane, The
Exercise of Jurisdiction over and Enforcement of Judgments Against Alien Defendants, 39
HASTINGS L.J. 799, 814–15 (1988) (suggesting that, because Pennoyer based its holding in
principles of sovereignty with respect to international law, the jurisdiction that is relevant
with respect to alien defendants is “American jurisdiction, and not the more specific [state]
jurisdiction”); Stephen E. Gottlieb, In Search of the Link Between Due Process and
Jurisdiction, 60 WASH. U. L.Q. 1291, 1294–95 (1983) (finding fault with Pennoyer for
grounding its allegedly constitutional holding in principles of international law, where the
Full Faith and Credit Clause does not apply).
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adjudicating state. 37 In so holding, the Court relied on the fiction of
corporate personhood. 38
The Court’s rigid framework, based solely on physical presence, inspired
several states to adopt consent-based laws that allowed their courts to
exercise jurisdiction over people and corporations who had, at least in a
theoretical sense, appointed agents competent to receive service of process
on the travelers’ behalf. 39 The Court’s endorsement of consent-based laws
marked its acknowledgement that states have a compelling interest in
regulating conduct that transpires within their borders, particularly when
issues of public safety are concerned.40
2. International Shoe and Jurisdiction over Corporations:
Pennoyer Survives, but Barely
The Supreme Court adapted Pennoyer’s in-state requirement to a more
technologically advanced era in International Shoe Co. v. Washington. 41 In
International Shoe, the defendant was a non-resident corporation that had
no offices, kept no inventory, and made no contracts in the forum state. 42 It
employed about a dozen salesmen within the forum, and would ship goods
to the forum whenever an order was placed. 43 The Court upheld
jurisdiction over the defendant because this comported with traditional
conceptions of fairness.44
While some commentators viewed International Shoe as a rejection of
Pennoyer’s presence requirement, 45 it has also been read simply as a
refinement of the doctrine. 46 Under International Shoe, a corporation may
be found “present” in a forum, and therefore subject to suit, when it has
certain “minimum contacts” with that forum, such that the exercise of
jurisdiction does not “offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial

37. See Riverside & Dan River Cotton Mills v. Menefee, 237 U.S. 189, 194 (1915).
38. See Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819).
Though a corporation is an “artificial being,” id., the Court has nevertheless held that
corporations are entitled to the due process protections of the Fourteenth Amendment, see
Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26, 28 (1889).
39. See, e.g., Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160, 164 (1916) (discussing a law that
demanded that out-of-state motorists sign a form appointing the Secretary of State as their
attorney, upon whom service of process would be sufficient to establish jurisdiction over the
motorists). The Court later upheld a Massachusetts law providing that all motorists within
the state had implicitly consented to appoint an agent to receive process on their behalf in
any litigation resulting from an automobile accident. See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352,
356–57 (1927).
40. See Kane, 242 U.S. at 167–68.
41. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
42. See id. at 313.
43. See id. at 314.
44. Id. at 320.
45. See, e.g., Gregory Trautman, Personal Jurisdiction in the Post-World-Wide
Volkswagen Era—Using a Market Analysis to Determine the Reach of Jurisdiction, 60
WASH. L. REV. 155, 157 (1984).
46. See Stein, supra note 9, at 693.
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justice.’” 47 Because the personhood of a corporation is itself a fiction,48 the
Court reasoned that corporate presence was also necessarily fictitious—it
was the actions of corporate agents, and not necessarily the corporation
itself, that were relevant in the new jurisdictional calculus. 49 Because the
cause of action “arose out of [the] . . . activities” that the defendant
corporation had conducted within the forum, it was reasonable, 50 according
to the International Shoe Court, for a state to assert jurisdiction.51
But an existence of minimum contacts 52 was not the Court’s sole
justification for finding jurisdiction proper. Justice Stone also asserted that
whenever a corporation “enjoys the benefits and protection of the laws” of a
state, the corporation can and should expect to be subject to a suit within
that state. 53 The benefits of acting under a state’s laws accrue whenever an
entity “exercises the privilege of conducting activities within a state.”54
These justifications for jurisdiction—state regulation of tortious conduct
47. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
Often overlooked in citations to International Shoe is the Court’s reliance on the
obsolescence of writs of capias ad respondendum in justifying the minimum contacts
hypothesis. Id. Such writs commanded a “sheriff to take the defendant into custody to
ensure that the defendant will appear in court.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 236 (9th ed.
2009). Once these writs “[gave] way to personal service of summons,” the Court did not
find the due process implications of extraterritorial jurisdiction to be quite so grave. Int’l
Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316. By focusing the analysis on fairness, and less on due process, the
Court implicitly acknowledged a compelling state interest in regulating tortious conduct by
actors outside the state that causes harm within it. See Stein, supra note 9, at 698–99.
48. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
49. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316–17; see also J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S.
Ct. 2780, 2798 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that International Shoe holds that
corporate presence and implied consent to suit “should be discarded, for they conceal the
actual bases on which jurisdiction rests”).
50. Though it did not expressly define what assertions of jurisdiction qualify as
reasonable, the Court proposed that, in addition to minimum contacts, an “‘estimate of the
inconveniences’ which would result to the corporation from a trial away from
its . . . principal place of business” was a relevant factor in the determination of fair play.
Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317 (quoting Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139, 141
(2d Cir. 1930)). In response, Justice Black criticized the majority for applying “elastic
standards” that did not have any textual basis in the Constitution. Id. at 325 (Black, J.,
concurring).
51. Id. at 320; see also Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445
(1952) (holding that the reasonableness of subjecting a foreign corporation to suit in a given
state must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, with attention paid to the specific actions the
corporation takes within or toward the given forum).
52. It is possible that, when International Shoe was decided, the word “minimum” had a
definition akin to “minimal,” meaning that the doctrine was intended to allow states to enjoy
broader jurisdiction across state lines. See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (“due process requires
only . . . minimum contacts”) (emphasis added). Later decisions came to regard “minimum”
as an adjectival threshold rather than a permissive proclamation. Cf. Fullerton, supra note 9,
at 10 n.38; see also infra Part I.B.3 (discussing judicial swelling and retrenchment of
jurisdictional principles after International Shoe).
53. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
54. Id. While minimum contacts have been interpreted as protecting a state’s regulatory
interest, this prong of International Shoe has been read to be grounded in a contract-based
exchange theory, under which a corporation implicitly agrees to hold itself amenable to suit
in exchange for the exploitation of a state’s inner resources. See Stein, supra note 9, at 699–
700; see also supra note 47 (examining the state’s regulatory interest in minimum contacts).
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and corporate consent to suit—have animated the Court’s subsequent
jurisdictional jurisprudence. 55
3. Modern Doctrine: The Court Tries to Apply International Shoe,
and Nobody Agrees
In McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 56 the Court upheld the
exercise of jurisdiction over a corporate defendant by conducting a
minimum contacts analysis with reference to the state’s regulatory
interest, 57 and not to the forum benefits that the defendant corporation had
enjoyed. 58 In other words, following International Shoe, if the defendant
could cause an actionable harm based upon the activity it conducted within
the forum, jurisdiction would be proper. 59
In McGee, an Arizona corporation, having no agents or offices in
California, had issued an insurance policy to a California resident.60 This
single policy was the only evidence of the corporation doing any business
whatsoever with any person in California.61 When a litigable claim arose
out of this policy, the state’s “manifest interest in providing effective means
of redress for its residents” was sufficient to justify jurisdiction despite the
defendant’s very minimal contacts with the forum. 62
The very next year, in Hanson v. Denckla, 63 the Court found jurisdiction
improper when a Florida resident sued a Delaware trust company in Florida
state court, even though the trustee had been remitting income to the
plaintiff in Florida. 64 Jurisdiction was rejected because, at the time the trust
was formed, the plaintiff had been a resident of Pennsylvania; at no time
had the defendant ever solicited business in Florida. 65 Without mentioning
fair play and substantial justice, the Court cited International Shoe for the
proposition that the defendant had not obtained any benefit or privilege
from doing business in the state of Florida, and therefore could not be sued
in that state. 66 The state’s regulatory interest in this case was not addressed.
Instead, the Court found the defendant’s “purposeful[] avail[ment] of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State” to be the essential

55. See Stein, supra note 9, at 700–03.
56. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
57. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
58. McGee, 355 U.S. at 221–23.
59. See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text.
60. McGee, 355 U.S. at 221–22.
61. See id. at 222.
62. Id. at 223. This reasoning has been found indicative of the Court’s willingness, in
certain cases, to apply a flexible standard in determining whether jurisdiction is proper. See
Graham C. Lilly, Jurisdiction over Alien and Domestic Defendants, 69 VA. L. REV. 85, 90
(1983). Under this standard, fairness and convenience to the plaintiff are given great weight;
this regulatory interest standard inspired one scholar to term McGee the “summit of
permissible jurisdiction.” Id. at 89–90.
63. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
64. Id. at 251–52.
65. Id. at 252.
66. Id.
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element. 67 Because the plaintiff’s move to Florida had been a “unilateral
activity,” the defendant’s relationship to Florida could not sustain
jurisdiction. 68
Almost twenty years later, in Shaffer v. Heitner,69 the Court considered
whether jurisdiction could lie against a defendant purely because his
property was within the forum state. 70 In Shaffer, the plaintiff had sued
directors of a Delaware corporation in a shareholders’ derivative suit. 71
Because the activities giving rise to the suit had taken place in Oregon, the
plaintiff, suing in Delaware, attempted to attach jurisdiction by filing a
motion for sequestration of the directors’ corporate stock. 72
The Court concluded that, even if Delaware had a compelling interest in
regulating the conduct of corporations within its borders, that interest was
better addressed by a choice-of-law analysis than an assertion of jurisdiction
based on a regulatory need. 73 When a state finds itself at the nexus of the
controversy, the Court reasoned, the state may have its own law govern the
dispute, but that does not empower the state to bring foreign defendants into
its courts to be subjected to that law. 74 Because of “our federal system of
government,” “‘[the satisfaction of due process] must depend . . . upon the
quality and nature of the [defendant’s] activity in relation to the fair and
orderly administration of the laws.’” 75
C. The Stream of Commerce Doctrine
This section explains personal jurisdiction in interstate and international
products liability cases. It begins with the tale of World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 76 the Supreme Court’s first analysis of when it might be
legitimate to exercise jurisdiction over a corporation that is not at all
67. Id. at 253.
68. Id. The Hanson Court found state lines relevant not for the purpose of determining
whether litigation was fair or convenient for the defendant, but for the purpose of preserving
a federal system that respects the “territorial limitations on the power of the respective
States.” Id. at 251.
69. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
70. Id. at 199. This type of jurisdiction, known as “quasi in rem” jurisdiction, had its
foundations in the idea that it was legitimate for a plaintiff to have access to a defendant’s
assets located within a forum state, as long as those assets were related to the controversy.
See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 725–26 (1878). This doctrine was later expanded to
provide for jurisdiction over all defendants in general claims when they possessed any
amount of property in the forum state. See Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 223 (1905).
71. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 189–90.
72. Id. at 190.
73. Id. at 215–16. Choice of law and personal jurisdiction are related but distinct
constitutional inquiries. A court’s decision to apply a particular state’s law to a given
controversy can be justified only when a state’s contacts with the dispute demonstrate a
regulatory interest, whereas the jurisdictional inquiry focuses on whether the defendant’s
contacts with the forum are such that an assertion of jurisdiction to promote a regulatory
interest does not violate the defendant’s individual liberty. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 807–08, 821–23 (1985).
74. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 215.
75. Id. at 203–04 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317, 319
(1945)).
76. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
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physically present—even with the benefit of a fiction 77—in a given forum.
It continues with an analysis of how courts and scholars interpreted the
World-Wide Volkswagen decision. It concludes with Asahi Metal Industry
Co. v. Superior Court of California, 78 a case in which the Court attempted
to clarify the doctrine, but only succeeded in muddying the waters.
1. Origins
As personal jurisdiction lurched into the final two decades of the
twentieth century, finding itself grounded alternately in conceptions of
fairness to the plaintiff, fairness to the defendant, and notions of territorial
federalism, 79 the Supreme Court analyzed the propriety of exercising
jurisdiction in a products liability case. Harry and Kay Robinson, the
plaintiffs in World-Wide Volkswagen, bought a car in the State of New
York. 80 A year later, the Robinsons left New York to move to Arizona.81
While driving their new car across the country, they were involved in a car
accident in Oklahoma. 82 The resulting fire severely burned Kay Robinson
and her children. 83 The Robinsons brought suit in Oklahoma, alleging
negligent design of the gas tank. 84 Among those named as defendants were
the regional distributor and retail dealer of the car.85 These defendants did
not have any specific or direct contacts with the state of Oklahoma. 86
The Court held that International Shoe’s minimum contacts test insulated
these defendants from suit for two reasons. First, a lack of contacts
“protects the defendant against the burdens of litigating in a distant or
inconvenient forum,” and second, the minimum contacts test “acts to ensure
that the States . . . do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by
their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system.” 87 In denying
jurisdiction, the Court acknowledged that the forum state’s interest in
regulating conduct is a relevant factor in determining jurisdictional fairness,
and even conceded that protecting a defendant from inconvenient litigation
was of diminishing importance in the same calculation. 88 But the Court
ultimately set fairness and regulatory interests aside, declaring:
Even if the defendant would suffer . . . no inconvenience . . . even if the
forum State has a strong interest in applying its law to the controversy;
even if the forum State is the most convenient location for litigation, the
Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate federalism, may

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
480 U.S. 102 (1987).
For a discussion of each justification, see supra Part I.B.
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 288.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 288–89.
Id. at 292.
See id. at 292–93.
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sometimes act to divest the State of its power to render a valid
judgment. 89

The Court held that even though the defendant could theoretically foresee
that a car—an inherently mobile product 90—could wind up in Oklahoma,
the foreseeability of harm was not enough to confer jurisdiction on
Oklahoma state courts.91 It was the “foreseeability . . . that the defendant’s
conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should
reasonably anticipate being haled into court there” that was key. 92 The
Court concluded that federalism concerns would have yielded to this
foreseeability if the defendants had purposefully availed themselves of the
privileges of doing business in Oklahoma. 93
Foreseeable litigation in a distant forum would be reasonable when a
corporation “delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the
expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum State.”94
The Court referred to the “stream of commerce” as the course of trade when
a manufacturer makes an effort “to serve directly or indirectly, the market
for its product in other States.” 95 Because the Robinsons had unilaterally
89. Id. at 294. This declaration of the primacy of federalism appeared to herald an era in
which the Court was no longer willing to balance equities to determine jurisdictional
fairness. See Howard B. Stravitz, Sayonara to Minimum Contacts: Asahi Metal Industry Co.
v. Superior Court, 39 S.C. L. REV. 729, 756–57 (1988). Interstate federalism did not hold the
championship belt for long. Two years later, the Court cautioned that “[the Due Process]
Clause is the only [constitutional] source of the personal jurisdiction requirement and the
Clause itself makes no mention of federalism concerns.” Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie
des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 n.10 (1982).
90. In dissent, Justice Marshall argued that cars, because they travel on and are served
by a “nationwide service network,” put sellers on notice that they may be subject to suit in
states to which these cars are driven. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 314
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
91. See id. at 297 (majority opinion).
92. See id. This foreseeability inquiry has come under criticism for circularity. If due
process depends on reasonable anticipation of a suit, then it plainly does not matter what the
jurisdictional standard is, as long as putative defendants are on notice that such a standard
exists. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 25, at 95; CASAD, supra note 22, at 2-60.
Moreover, the fairness standard adopted in International Shoe was authored by the Court sua
sponte, without the parties having briefed or argued the case with reference to traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice. See STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 81
(6th ed. 2004). If a landmark jurisdiction case led to a result that surprised both parties,
foreseeability of litigation is troublesome as a jurisdictional precept.
93. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
94. Id. at 298.
95. Id. at 297. In support of this proposition, the Court cited Gray v. American Radiator
& Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761 (Ill. 1961). See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444
U.S. at 298. The Gray court found jurisdiction proper in a products liability claim over a
foreign manufacturer that, through a middleman, sent its products into the forum state in
which they were alleged to have injured the plaintiff. See Gray, 176 N.E.2d at 762, 766 (“[I]t
is seldom that a manufacturer deals directly with consumers in other States . . . the use of
[its] products in the ordinary course of commerce is sufficient contact with [the forum state]
to justify a requirement that [it] defend [t]here.”); see also R. Lawrence Dessem, Personal
Jurisdiction After Asahi: The Other (International) Shoe Drops, 55 TENN. L. REV. 41, 52–55
(1988) (analyzing federal appeals court decisions written between World-Wide Volkswagen
and Asahi, and determining that “a majority of the federal appellate circuits upheld an
expansive exercise of stream of commerce jurisdiction, in several cases premised solely
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moved the car into Oklahoma, a state the defendants had not been trying to
serve even indirectly, the Court concluded that Oklahoma did not have
jurisdiction. 96
2. Interpreting World-Wide Volkswagen
The Court decided Rush v. Savchuk 97 on the same day it issued its WorldWide Volkswagen opinion. In Rush, the Court reiterated its position that, in
deciding jurisdictional questions, “the inquiry must focus on ‘the
relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.’”98 The
Court had already held that a relationship based on a single contact could be
sufficient to justify jurisdiction.99 Yet the Court did not articulate what it
actually meant for a contact to be related to the litigation. 100
The stream of commerce test is used to determine whether an out-of-state
manufacturer’s act constitutes a contact that is related to a jurisdictional
event that is alleged to have caused harm to a plaintiff. 101 But a unilateral
act by the plaintiff, in which she moves herself and any relevant goods to an
unanticipated state, satisfies the Court that the stream of commerce has
dried up before it reached the forum. 102
A question remained open, however: How would a court view a
defendant’s relationship with the forum in a stream-of-commerce case
where the plaintiff took no action to bring the product into her home state?
What if the product was delivered there? 103
While that question percolated in the lower courts, the Supreme Court
continued to hold that, when the harmful effects of a defendant’s conduct
should reasonably be expected to be felt in the forum state, jurisdiction was
proper. 104 This test, which sustains jurisdiction over foreign defendants
upon a manufacturer’s foreseeability or awareness”); Trautman, supra note 45, at 175 (citing
cases to show that, after Gray, courts considered the size of the benefit that a foreign
corporation received by doing business in a forum in determining the propriety of enforcing
jurisdiction, and that “the defendant’s interests can be adequately protected without requiring
jurisdiction over the defendant to hinge on a literal showing of purposeful contacts with the
forum state”).
96. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 298 (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,
253 (1958)).
97. 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
98. Id. at 327 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977)).
99. See supra notes 56–62 and accompanying text.
100. See Lea Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court
Jurisdiction, 1980 SUP. CT. REV. 77, 82.
101. See Gray v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761, 766–67 (Ill.
1961).
102. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
103. See Trautman, supra note 45, at 162–64 (foreseeing problems in applying the
Hanson doctrine to stream of commerce cases, and suggesting that the appropriate way to
view the corporate defendant’s relationship with the forum would be centered on the benefits
it received in connection with the forum).
104. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 786–90 (1984) (finding jurisdiction in California
proper over Floridian defendants who had written and edited an allegedly libelous story,
published in the National Enquirer, about a California resident, despite the defendant’s
objections that they, as writer and editor, were not responsible for the distribution scheme
that led the article to be circulated in California); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S.
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based on actual or constructive knowledge that their out-of-state conduct
could cause harm within a forum, has also been endorsed in an international
context. 105 Minimum contacts remained the touchstone of the jurisdictional
test, 106 but once sufficient contacts have been established, their existence
unlocks the door for courts to consider several other factors in a balancing
of the equities to determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction is
“reasonable.” 107 The regulatory justification for jurisdiction survived,
recast as the state’s “manifest interest” in giving its residents adequate relief
if they are injured by out-of-state actors. 108
The stream of commerce test was used as one mechanism through which
reasonableness might be demonstrated.109 But independent of that stream,
and independent of any notions of consent to suit, a defendant who
“purposefully directs” goods or activities toward a forum state was also
subject to the forum’s jurisdiction. 110 Courts generally required a specific
geographical nexus, such that the defendant can be on notice that it is
subject to suit in a distinct locale, and might buy insurance or simply
remove itself or its goods from the state to insulate itself from suit there.111
All that is necessary to provoke defendants to engage in such precaution is
“fair warning that a particular activity may subject them to the jurisdiction
of a foreign sovereign.” 112
3. Asahi and the Stream of Commerce Doctrine’s Application to Alien
Defendants: Nobody Agrees
In 1987, the Court attempted to apply the stream of commerce analysis to
an alien defendant. Gary Zurcher, whose wife was killed in a motorcycle
accident in California, filed suit against Cheng Shin Rubber, a Taiwanese

770, 781 (1984) (where a defendant has “continuously and deliberately exploited [a] market,
it must reasonably anticipate being haled into court there”).
105. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 49(1) (1971) (“A state has
power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over a foreign corporation which has done, or has
caused to be done, an act in the state with respect to any cause of action in tort arising from
the act.”) (emphasis added). The Restatement uses “foreign” in the conventional sense,
describing cases involving international litigation. See id. § 41 (test of jurisdiction over
“domestic corporations”).
106. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985).
107. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
108. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 473.
109. See id.
110. Id. But see C. Douglas Floyd & Shima Baradaran-Robison, Toward a Unified Test of
Personal Jurisdiction in an Era of Widely Diffused Wrongs: The Relevance of Purpose and
Effects, 81 IND. L.J. 601, 629–31 (2006) (arguing that an analysis of a defendant’s “purpose”
is necessarily subjective, and that it should therefore be irrelevant to the foreseeability
inquiry); see also Stravitz, supra note 89, at 778 (suggesting that in Burger King, Justice
Brennan chose the phrase “purposefully directed” in order to broaden the narrower
“purposefully availed” standard announced in Hanson v. Denckla, thereby creating a more
inclusive standard that subjects “out-of-state actors causing in-state effects” to suit more
frequently).
111. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
112. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 218 (1977)
(Stevens, J., concurring)).
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company that manufactured an allegedly defective tire tube. 113 Cheng Shin
filed a cross-complaint seeking indemnification by Asahi, a Japanese
manufacturer of the tube’s component valve assemblies. 114 After Zurcher
settled his claims with all defendants, the trial court was left with Cheng
Shin’s indemnity claim against Asahi, and the question whether a California
court might properly exercise jurisdiction over Asahi for the purposes of
that dispute. 115
Asahi had not done any business directly in California.116 All of the
valve assemblies it had made for Cheng Shin were sent to Taiwan.117
While Asahi’s sales to Cheng Shin accounted for approximately 1 percent
of its business, Cheng Shin asserted that 20 percent of its U.S. sales were
conducted in California. 118
Based on the balancing test outlined in World-Wide Volkswagen, 119 the
Court considered the totality of the facts, and unanimously concluded that,
given the “international context, the heavy burden on the alien defendant,
and the slight interests of the plaintiff and the forum State, the exercise of
personal jurisdiction by a California court over Asahi in this instance would
be unreasonable and unfair.” 120 Because (1) the burden on the defendant
was high; (2) the indemnity plaintiff was not a California resident; and (3)
California had little interest in the resolution of an indemnity claim between
alien defendants, the Court held that an exercise of jurisdiction would
violate “‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”121
Quoting United States v. First National City Bank, Justice O’Connor noted,
“‘Great care and reserve should be exercised when extending our notions of
personal jurisdiction into the international field.’”122
One reason that Justice O’Connor was hesitant to sustain jurisdiction
over an alien corporation was that the burden of litigating in such a distant
forum would be “severe,” since Asahi would be required “not only to
113. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 105–06 (1987).
114. Id. at 106.
115. Id.
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
120. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114–16.
121. Id. at 113–15 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). But
see Stravitz, supra note 89, at 794–97 (finding the Asahi Court’s fairness analysis “overly
conclusory,” because, among other reasons: (1) the burden on an alien defendant will
usually be high; (2) an increasingly global economy negates, in part, travel concerns for alien
defendants; and (3) the absence of a California plaintiff, due only to settlement, should not
be sufficient to defeat jurisdiction because “subsequent litigational developments” such as
settlement should not be found to “dislodge[]” jurisdiction if it had been present at the
outset).
122. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 115 (quoting United States v. First Nat’l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378,
404 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting). But cf. FEDERALIST NO. 80, supra note 27, at 485 (failing
to anticipate the technological advances that might render state court jurisdiction over alien
torts a constitutional question); Degnan & Kane, supra note 36, at 813 (arguing that “[i]n the
international order, there is no such thing as [states],” and therefore other nations are
indifferent as to whether jurisdiction is exercised over their residents in one state or another,
as long as jurisdiction in the United States as a whole is valid).
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traverse the distance between [Japan and California], but also to submit its
dispute with Cheng Shin to a foreign nation’s judicial system.” 123 As
another policy justification for her reluctance, Justice O’Connor cited
Professor Born, 124 who called for “heightened constitutional scrutiny” of
jurisdiction over aliens. 125
The concern was not that U.S. plaintiffs would suddenly start launching
frivolous claims against alien defendants because jurisdiction would be
made easier to acquire.126 Rather, it was that alien courts would grow
weary of unreasonable extensions of U.S. jurisdiction, and thereby be
prompted to terminate a relationship of comity. 127 In that sense, Justice
O’Connor appeared to consider “fairness” not only with respect to the issue
before her, but with respect to the possibility that future litigants would be
unable to achieve fair results due to a breakdown in comity.
This principle, while valid, can be difficult to apply in a jurisdictional
context for several reasons. First, the Court had previously referenced
fairness to future litigants only obliquely. 128 Second, at the time Asahi was
decided, different nations employed different models of jurisdictional
fairness, 129 many of which are still more favorable to the plaintiff than the
various models applied in the United States.130 And finally, international
123. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114. But see RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS 174 (4th ed. 2001) (“The Court’s description of defendant’s burden reads
as though Asahi would travel by canoe, had no product liability insurance, and could not, as
it did, hire excellent lawyers.”).
124. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 115.
125. Gary B. Born, Reflections on Judicial Jurisdiction in International Cases, 17 GA. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 35 (1987). Professor Born’s warning aside, it is not at all apparent that
there is a pressing international concern to make sure that close jurisdictional cases are
decided one way or another. See Michael Akehurst, Jurisdiction in International Law, 46
BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 145, 174–77, 212–14, 226–27 (1973).
126. See Dessem, supra note 95, at 80.
127. “Comity” refers to the international practice of nations giving respect to each other’s
judicial acts. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 303 (9th ed. 2009). The principles of comity
with respect to international cooperation are similar to the principles of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause with respect to federal cooperation. See supra notes 22, 31 and accompanying
text. For a full discussion of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, see
generally STEPHEN C. MCCAFFREY & THOMAS O. MAIN, TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 587–670 (2010).
128. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
129. See Degnan & Kane, supra note 36, at 847–50 (arguing that because of these
discrepancies, a state jurisdictional standard based on national contacts will “receive at least
no worse a reception than those obtained under the current state contacts standard”); von
Mehren & Trautman, supra note 16, at 1122 (“[N]o fundamental distinction needs to be
drawn between the jurisdictional problems raised by litigation involving international
elements arising in an American [state] court . . . and those raised by litigation in which the
nonlocal elements are connected with sister states.”).
130. Germany, for instance, grants jurisdiction over a defendant whenever she owns
property in Germany, even if that property is unconnected to the litigation. See RICHARD D.
FREER & WENDY COLLINS PERDUE, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES, MATERIALS, AND QUESTIONS
143 (3d ed. 2001). France allows jurisdiction over any defendant as long as a French citizen
is suing in French court. See id. And in the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction, the EU
allows for jurisdiction by necessity, where a defendant may be sued in any EU jurisdiction in
which a fellow defendant is domiciled. Council Regulation 44/2001, art. 6.1, 2001 O.J. (L
12) 1, 4–5 (EC), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=
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corporations sell different goods and carry on business in vastly different
ways—given this diversity of scope and scale, a jurisdictional inquiry that
is not fact-based and hews instead to “talismanic formulas” can lead to
problems in application. 131
Regardless of O’Connor’s justifications, a majority of the Justices agreed
that a fairness analysis is only appropriate if, in the first instance, the
defendant is found to have the “minimum contacts” necessary to justify the
equitable inquiry. 132 On the question of minimum contacts, the Court
splintered into three separate opinions, unable to form a majority on the
question of whether Asahi had sufficient contacts to unlock the question of
fairness. 133
Because Asahi did no business on its own initiative in California, and did
not purposefully direct its wares or products at the forum, 134 the analysis
came down to an interpretation of the stream of commerce doctrine.135
Justice O’Connor, writing for four Justices, opined:
The placement of a product into the stream of commerce, without more, is
not an act of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State.
Additional conduct . . . to serve the market in the forum State [is
required]. . . . [D]esigning the product for the market in the forum State,
advertising in the forum State, . . . or marketing the product through a
distributor who has agreed to serve as the sales agent in the forum State
[may suffice]. But a defendant’s awareness that the stream of commerce
may . . . sweep the product into the forum State does not [create minimum
contacts.] 136

Justice Brennan, also writing for four Justices, disagreed. He asserted,
“As long as a [defendant] is aware that the final product is being marketed
in the forum State, the possibility of a lawsuit there cannot come as a
surprise. Nor will the litigation present a burden for which there is no
corresponding benefit.” 137 This idea was not new—the notion that a
OJ:L:2001:012:0001:0023:en:PDF; see also MCCAFFREY & MAIN, supra note 127, at 127–
29.
131. DAVID EPSTEIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION: A GUIDE TO JURISDICTION,
PRACTICE, AND STRATEGY 6-14.1 (3d ed. 1998).
132. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 108–09; see also supra note 107 and accompanying text.
133. See Stravitz, supra note 89, at 788.
134. But see supra note 103 and accompanying text (noting that purposeful availment
may be an inappropriate standard in stream of commerce cases).
135. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112, 119–20. Because of the factual dissimilarities between
World-Wide Volkswagen and Asahi, it has been suggested that the stream of commerce
analysis in the former case (product unilaterally moved by consumer) is inapplicable to the
latter (product set in stream of commerce by manufacturer and alleged to have been sold in
the forum state). See Dessem, supra note 95, at 69–70.
136. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112. O’Connor’s theory of jurisdiction has come to be known as
the “stream of commerce ‘plus’ theory.” E.g., Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Still N the Water
Publ’g, 327 F.3d 472, 479 (6th Cir. 2003).
137. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment). The language Justice Brennan uses is likely a tip of the cap to the foreseeability
analysis in World-Wide Volkswagen, where it was the defendant’s ability to foresee a lawsuit
in a forum, and not the eventual presence of goods therein, that counted. See supra notes 91–
93 and accompanying text.
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manufacturer benefits from the efforts of distributors in foreign states, and
should therefore be subject to suit where its products are sold, was
interpreted by at least one circuit court to have been the lesson of WorldWide Volkswagen. 138
Finally, Justice Stevens, writing for three Justices, concluded that the
Court had mixed up the order of the steps in its jurisdictional test, reasoning
that fairness should be considered before minimum contacts.139 Because he
agreed with O’Connor’s holding that a California court’s exercise of
jurisdiction over Asahi would be unreasonable and unfair, he concurred in
the result. 140
Apparently for the sake of argument, Justice Stevens scrutinized the
stream of commerce “plus” test and found that O’Connor’s distinction
between “mere awareness” that a product will wind up in a forum state and
“purposeful availment” of that forum was drawn too sharply. 141 Although
Asahi may not have aimed its products toward California, or availed itself
of the protections of its laws, Justice Stevens believed that Asahi’s
“quantum of conduct” could satisfy a minimum contacts test. 142 Evaluating
whether this quantum was sufficient to establish minimum contacts required
a “constitutional determination that is affected by the volume, the value,
and the hazardous character of the components” in question.143 Though he
begged off actually conducting this determination, Justice Stevens
suspected Asahi’s conduct would, “[i]n most circumstances,” be sufficient
to satisfy minimum contacts scrutiny. 144
4. Judicial Confusion and Scholarly Criticism After Asahi
The dueling Asahi opinions left lower courts and critics with a muddled
rubric for deciding future stream of commerce cases involving the torts of
alien corporations. On one hand, the entire Supreme Court united over the
visceral notion that jurisdiction over Asahi would be unfair under
International Shoe. 145 But collectively, nobody knew which opinion to
follow, or how the Due Process Clause interacted with “minimum contacts”
in the international corporate context.146 The battle between Justices
138. See Oswalt v. Scripto, Inc., 616 F.2d 191, 198 (5th Cir. 1980).
139. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 121–22 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (first finding that an exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable, and therefore
finding a minimum contacts analysis inappropriate).
140. Id. at 121.
141. Id. at 122.
142. Id.
143. Id. In 1974, for instance, a federal district court found that the sale of a single
construction crane within a state constituted “doing business” within that state, thereby
leaving the defendant subject to personal jurisdiction. Gorso v. Bell Equip. Corp., 376 F.
Supp. 1027, 1029, 1031–32 (W.D. Pa. 1974). But see World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 296 n.11 (1980) (rejecting the argument that jurisdiction should be
sustained solely because a car is a “dangerous instrumentality”).
144. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 122.
145. Id. at 113–14.
146. See, e.g., Degnan & Kane, supra note 36, at 812–13 (because the Due Process
Clause “regulates only what the courts of one American state can do to persons who are in
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O’Connor and Brennan, waged over the correct definition of minimum
contacts in the stream of commerce, had come out a draw,147 while
Stevens’s brief concurrence picked up support where it could.148
Each of the leading stream of commerce opinions was attacked as an
inadequate model that departed from the goals, constitutional
underpinnings, and precedential history of personal jurisdiction.149 Even
the fairness inquiry, on which each Justice had agreed, fell under
criticism. 150 In the end, the lower courts were left with a splintered set of
plurality opinions that provided little guidance.151 This is where the
doctrine stood in October 2001, when Robert Nicastro set to work on a J.
McIntyre metal-shearing machine. 152
II. THE NICASTRO CASE
Part II examines Nicastro, the Supreme Court’s latest pronouncement on
the issue of personal jurisdiction. First, it tells the story of Robert Nicastro
and the company whose machine came to remove four of his fingers. It
then examines the Supreme Court’s plurality opinion, which set forth a
strict test that insulated the company from the exercise of jurisdiction.
Next, this part considers the dissent’s argument, which sharply criticizes the
another American state,” O’Connor’s test impermissibly “transformed [the] interest of the
‘several States’ into the interests of nations”).
147. See Angela M. Laughlin, This Ain’t the Texas Two Step Folks: Disharmony,
Confusion, and the Unfair Nature of Personal Jurisdiction Analysis in the Fifth Circuit, 37
CAP. U. L. REV. 681, 727–28 app. A (2009) (charting each circuit and state court’s position
on whether O’Connor’s, Brennan’s, or neither’s stream of commerce test was correct); see
also Matthew R. Huppert, Note, Commercial Purpose as Constitutional Purpose:
Reevaluating Asahi Through the Lens of International Patent Litigation, 111 COLUM. L.
REV. 624, 642 n.110 (2011) (compiling cases indicating disharmony among the circuits).
148. See Stravitz, supra note 89, at 793 (finding that Justices O’Connor and Brennan
failed to sufficiently analyze the “unique problems posed by component part manufacturers,”
and that only Stevens’s equitable framework was capable of considering the shades of gray
inherent in international products liability litigation).
149. See Mollie A. Murphy, Personal Jurisdiction and the Stream of Commerce Theory:
A Reappraisal and a Revised Approach, 77 KY. L.J. 243, 311–13 (1989) (finding that
O’Connor’s standard was underinclusive, and Brennan’s overinclusive with respect to
finding jurisdiction over foreign corporations); Todd David Peterson, The Timing of
Minimum Contacts, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 101, 118 (2011) (faulting both opinions for
failing to link their minimum contacts analysis to the Due Process Clause in any way); David
E. Seidelson, A Supreme Court Conclusion and Two Rationales that Defy Comprehension:
Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court of California, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 563, 574–
75, 579 (1988) (finding the “plus” test to be impossible to satisfy in some cases where
jurisdiction is clearly warranted); Stravitz, supra note 89, at 791 (criticizing O’Connor’s
opinion for failing to account for the precedential value of Gray as hailed by World-Wide
Volkswagen).
150. See supra notes 120–21 and accompanying text.
151. Several models have been proposed to help lower courts arrive at coherent readings
of a set of Supreme Court plurality opinions. See Ken Kimura, Note, A Legitimacy Model for
the Interpretation of Plurality Decisions, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1593, 1596–1604 (1992). A
splintered set of plurality opinions essentially sends the judicial question back down to the
lower courts to struggle with, and to select, those opinions with which they agree based on
whatever criteria they deem persuasive. See Linda Novak, The Precedential Value of
Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 756, 774–76 (1980).
152. See Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am. Ltd., 987 A.2d 575, 577 (N.J. 2010).
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plurality for hewing too rigidly to jurisdictional tests and failing to achieve
a fair result. Then, Breyer’s concurrence is analyzed. Finally, a brief look
at two recent district court cases calls Nicastro’s precedential relevance into
question.
A. A Unique Set of Facts
On October 11, 2001, Robert Nicastro was working at the Curcio Scrap
Metal Plant in Saddle Brook, New Jersey. 153 On that day, he found himself
in front of the McIntyre Model 640 Shear, a metal-cutting machine. 154 In
the course of his work, Nicastro’s right hand became entangled with the
blades of the machine, and four of his fingers were thereby severed from his
hand. 155 The machine had been manufactured by J. McIntyre Machinery,
Ltd. (J. McIntyre). 156 J. McIntyre was incorporated in the United Kingdom
and sold its machines through McIntyre Machinery America, Ltd.
(McIntyre America), its exclusive U.S. distributor. 157
Despite their similar names, J. McIntyre and McIntyre America were
separate corporations, with no common operation or ownership.158
McIntyre America did, however, “‘structure[] [its] advertising and sales
efforts in accordance with [J. McIntyre’s] direction and guidance whenever
possible.’” 159 While J. McIntyre asserted that it simply sold its machines to
McIntyre America for distribution, there was some evidence to indicate that
some machines were sold on consignment to the distributor. 160
Seeking compensation for his injury, Nicastro filed suit against both J.
McIntyre and McIntyre America in New Jersey state court. The complaint
alleged that J. McIntyre’s machine was dangerously unsafe because it did
not include a safety guard, “‘failed to contain adequate warnings or
instructions,’ and . . . ‘allow[ed] the plaintiff to become injured while
operating the machine in the normal course of his employment.’” 161
Prior to the sale of the machine in question, J. McIntyre officials had
“attended trade conventions, exhibitions, and conferences throughout the
United States . . . [while] McIntyre America fielded any requests for
information about . . . products at the scrap metal conventions and trade
shows in the United States.” 162 It was at one such trade show, in Las
Vegas, where the owner of Curcio Scrap Metal first met with
representatives of J. McIntyre (the U.K. company) and became interested in

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

See id. at 577–78.
See id. at 577.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 579.
Id. (quoting a January 2000 letter from McIntyre America to J. McIntyre).
See id.
See id. at 578 (quoting the plaintiff’s initial complaint).
Id. at 579.
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purchasing one of its machines. 163 Within a year of that meeting, Curcio
purchased the machine for $24,900. 164
B. The Plurality Announces a Strict Jurisdictional Rule
The description of Nicastro’s injury in each opinion forecasts the
opinion’s ultimate conclusion. 165 In penning the plurality opinion, Justice
Kennedy focused on the strict jurisdictional calculus.166 Justice Kennedy
believed that the “traditional practice” of international jurisdiction was best
articulated by the stream of commerce “plus” theory, 167 and found that a
New Jersey state court could not entertain a claim against J. McIntyre based
on the facts of the case. 168 In so finding, Justice Kennedy held close to the
principle that a manufacturer must “‘seek to serve’ a given State’s
market.” 169 A defendant’s “intention to submit to the power of a
sovereign” is the controlling factor in determining whether it has sought to
serve the market. 170 It is here that Justice Kennedy trotted out a
surprising 171 hypothetical, warning that Brennan’s test,172 if it had been
adopted would have left a small-time Florida farmer amenable to suit

163. See id. at 578.
164. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2795 (2011) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
165. Compare id. at 2786–87 (plurality opinion) (“Robert Nicastro seriously injured his
hand while using a metal-shearing machine.”), with id. at 2795 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(“[A] three-ton metal shearing machine severed four fingers on Robert Nicastro’s right
hand.”).
166. Id. at 2787 (plurality opinion) (“Freeform notions of fundamental fairness divorced
from traditional practice cannot transform a judgment rendered in the absence of authority
into law.”); cf. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 621–22 (1990) (finding that no
fairness inquiry is necessary when jurisdiction is traditionally valid under a given set of
facts, because the historical “pedigree” of the exercise of jurisdiction is de facto proof of
traditional fairness). But see id. at 630 (Brennan, J., concurring) (history itself cannot be
“decisive,” and “‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice can be as readily
offended by the perpetuation of ancient forms that are no longer justified as by the adoption
of new procedures that are inconsistent with the basic values of our constitutional heritage’”
(quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977))).
167. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. Though Justice Kennedy did not
explicitly state that O’Connor’s test is appropriate and Brennan’s is not, the language of the
opinion implicitly adopts the “plus” standard. See Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2788 (“The
defendant’s transmission of goods permits the exercise of jurisdiction only where the
defendant can be said to have targeted the forum; as a general rule, it is not enough that the
defendant might have predicted that its goods will reach the forum State.”).
168. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2790–91.
169. Id. at 2788 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295
(1980)). The plurality’s reasoning in this section of the opinion, which attempts to balance
notions of state sovereignty against individual liberty, while still taking account of fairness,
has been cited by at least one commentator as evidence of incoherence in the doctrine. See
Patrick J. Borchers, J. McIntyre Machinery, Goodyear, and the Incoherence of the Minimum
Contacts Test, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1245, 1255–56 (2011).
170. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2788. But see Dessem, supra note 95, at 68–69 (because
“intent” is rarely black and white, “to include [it] as an element of personal jurisdiction will
further complicate an already complex determination”).
171. See infra notes 227–31 and accompanying text.
172. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
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should his products somehow reach Alaska through a national distribution
chain. 173
In applying his view of the doctrine to the facts, Justice Kennedy found
that J. McIntyre had not sought to serve the specific forum of New
Jersey. 174 Because J. McIntyre “had no office in New Jersey; it neither paid
taxes nor owned property there; and it neither advertised in, nor sent any
employees” there, J. McIntyre had not “purposefully availed itself of the
New Jersey market.” 175 There was, therefore, no lawful jurisdiction in New
Jersey. 176
C. The Nicastro Dissent: Whither Fairness?
Justice Ginsburg’s argument in dissent was simple: Kennedy’s analysis
was just not fair. 177 In a key paragraph, Justice Ginsburg explained why:
Is it not fair and reasonable . . . to require the international seller to defend
at the place its products cause injury? . . . On what measure of reason and
fairness can it be considered undue to require [J. McIntyre] to defend in
New Jersey as an incident of its efforts to develop a market for its
industrial machines anywhere and everywhere in the United States? Is

173. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2790; see also supra note 18 and accompanying text. There
are a number of problems with this hypothetical. First, Justice Kennedy does not offer
support for his assertion that a jurisdictional rule that applies to large alien corporation
defendants must necessarily also apply to small individual domestic defendants. See
Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2790. Second, the facts of the hypothetical and Nicastro itself are
vastly dissimilar. A corporation that attends trade shows across the country and seeks to sell
its machines from across an ocean cannot be said to be analogous to an “owner of a small . . .
farm [who] sell[s] crops to a large nearby distributor.” Id. Third, Justice Kennedy fails to
account for the possibility of supplementing Brennan’s stream of commerce theory with a
fairness analysis. For instance, if courts were to apply Justice Stevens’s standard, see Asahi
Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 122 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring), the
international distribution of metal-shearing machines capable of severing fingers should
indeed be regarded differently than the sale of citrus fruits, the occasional poisonous orange
notwithstanding.
174. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2790.
175. Id. This line of reasoning had been anticipated by at least one scholar in the wake of
the World-Wide Volkswagen decision. See Trautman, supra note 45, at 163–64 (“A dealer
goes into business with the expectation (indeed, the hope) that many different consumers
will frequent [its] business. . . . For purposes of asserting jurisdiction, the significant factor
often is not whether the dealer ‘purposefully’ conducts activities in another state, but rather
whether the dealer receives a sizeable benefit from the connection with the other states.”).
Justice Stevens’s proposed case-by-case analysis of the value and hazardous nature of the
actual product to determine the appropriateness of jurisdiction over alien defendants squares
with Trautman’s observation much more easily than Justice Kennedy’s bright-line availment
test. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
176. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2791. At oral argument, Justice Kennedy was sympathetic to
the doctrinal notion that Nicastro could have sued J. McIntyre in Ohio, where McIntyre
America was located, but not in New Jersey. The relationship between manufacturer and
distributor seemed to persuade Justice Kennedy that it would not offend notions of fair play
and substantial justice to have Nicastro travel to Ohio to file suit in a state where neither the
alleged tort nor the resulting injury took place. See Oral Argument at 12:30, Nicastro, 131 S.
Ct. 2780 (No. 09-1343), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2010_09_
1343?page=1.
177. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2804 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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not the burden on [J. McIntyre] to defend in New Jersey fair, i.e., a
reasonable cost of transacting business internationally . . . ? 178

Ginsburg felt that Nicastro presented a unique set of facts. 179 Given these
facts, 180 the case presented a much better opportunity to apply the stream of
commerce test in evaluating minimum contacts than Asahi, where the
Justices could agree on a fairness analysis, but found themselves in disarray
with respect to the stream of commerce inquiry. 181
In Asahi, it had been plainly unfair for a California state court to exercise
jurisdiction over a Japanese corporation that “did not itself seek out
customers in the United States, . . . engaged no distributor to promote its
wares here, . . . appeared at no tradeshows in the United States, and . . . had
no Web site advertising its products to the world.”182 Given these
distinctions from the facts of the case before her, 183 Ginsburg found that
reliance on Asahi as controlling authority was “dead wrong.” 184
Finally, the dissent raised a point of policy: the plurality’s holding would
set the United States at a disadvantage because the Brussels agreement,185
which is the European Union’s jurisdictional agreement, would have
178. Id. at 2800–01. At oral argument, Ginsburg’s objections became particularly
strenuous when J. McIntyre’s counsel acknowledged that the corporation would be subject to
suit in Ohio (where the company that distributed its machines was located), an admission
that all but conceded that litigating in New Jersey could not be a comparatively undue
burden on J. McIntyre. See Oral Argument at 5:44, Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (No. 09-1343),
available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2010_09_1343 ?page=1.
179. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2802–03. Here Justice Ginsburg wrote in direct conflict with
Justice Breyer, who believed that Asahi controlled the case as a matter of precedent. See
infra note 206 and accompanying text. As discussed earlier, a rigid interpretation of Asahi
may be problematic when unanticipated fact patterns are presented. See supra note 131 and
accompanying text.
180. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2795–96. The dissent proposed a holistic understanding of
jurisdiction, and considered: (1) the size of the New Jersey scrap metal industry; (2) the
prominence and breadth of the U.S. trade conventions that J. McIntyre had attended; and (3)
the fact that J. McIntyre’s sales had generally been better in the United States than in other
international markets. This understanding supported Ginsburg’s belief that J. McIntyre
cared little about which particular states its machines wound up in, and intended to serve a
national market. But see id. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring) (asserting that these facts could
not be considered in the Court’s decision because they had not been considered by the
Supreme Court of New Jersey).
181. See supra Part I.C.4.
182. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2803 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
183. See supra notes 153–64.
184. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2803 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). If Justice Ginsburg sought
any guidance from the splintered Asahi opinions, she found it in Stevens’s model of
considering fairness before conducting a minimum contacts analysis. See supra notes 139–
40 and accompanying text. Justice Ginsburg did not cite Justice Stevens directly. But she
argued that it would be incredible, given the size of New Jersey’s scrap metal industry, to
assert that a corporation who seeks to distribute its metal-shearing machine to the United
States did not intend to sell products in New Jersey. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2795–96, 2801
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). To Justice Ginsburg, this intuitive notion was dispositive of J.
McIntyre’s purposeful availment of New Jersey, and therefore of the existence of minimum
contacts. Id. at 2801. Further, Justice Ginsburg echoed Justice Stevens in acknowledging the
hazardous character of a metal-shearing machine with a “massive cutting capacity.” Id. at
2795 (internal citation omitted).
185. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
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allowed for jurisdiction against J. McIntyre anywhere within the EU for a
claim brought under the same set of facts. 186 That the United States is not a
party to such an agreement may not be surprising, given international
recalcitrance to face the “fabulous damage awards” 187 handed out by U.S.
juries in products liability cases, and the U.S. litigational advantages that
prospective plaintiffs covet.188 But even if conceded,189 these points do not
make the absence of jurisdiction any fairer to Nicastro, nor the disadvantage
any less bitter to any U.S. plaintiff injured under similar circumstances.190
D. Is the Doctrine Old Fashioned? Modern Technology,
the Supreme Court of New Jersey, and the Nicastro Concurrence
Before Nicastro reached the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of New
Jersey had grappled with Asahi, concluding that state precedent aligned
more closely with the Brennan standard than the O’Connor standard. 191
This was old stuff; state and federal courts had been choosing between
these two standards for decades. 192 But having reached that conclusion, the
Supreme Court of New Jersey put its own spin on the fairness
discussion. 193
The court noted that “traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice” evolve, and “must also reflect modern truths—the radical
transformation of the international economy.” 194 The court posited that
because of air travel, defending a suit in New Jersey would not be terribly
inconvenient for a U.K. defendant who expected to serve at least some
186. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2803–04.
187. J.K. Hetrick & Gregg T. Nunziata, Foreign Product Liability Actions in United
States Courts, in LIABILITY FOR PRODUCTS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY: THE COMPARATIVE LAW
YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 59, 60 (Dennis Campbell & Susan Woodley eds.,
2004).
188. See id. at 59–62.
189. The concession is for argument’s sake. If J. McIntyre had been exposed to
unreasonably high damage awards in New Jersey state court, it may have been more
appropriate to respond to such challenges by removing the action to federal court. See 28
U.S.C. §§ 1332(a)(2), 1441(a) (2006); see also Stephan Wilske & Todd J. Fox, The SoCalled “Judicial Hellholes” in US Jurisdictions and Possible Means to Avoid Them, DISP.
RESOL. INT’L, Sept. 2008, at 235, 241–42, 247 (discussing venue and removal). If timely
effected, removal to federal court does not deprive the defendant of the opportunity to
contest jurisdiction. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 131, at 6-9.
190. See Borchers, supra note 169, at 1260. Even if adverse state court judgments have
become prohibitively expensive for alien corporations, Asahi arguably went too far to protect
these corporations. See In re DES Cases, 789 F. Supp. 552, 575 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (“The
Asahi-Volkswagen approach is particularly pernicious in the advantage it gives to foreign
producers whose goods enter the American common market. These firms can organize
themselves to avoid jurisdiction in any state or federal court. . . . Because jurisdictional due
process allows many foreign manufacturers to circumvent the American courts altogether,
United States residents often will be unable to avail themselves of the strong protections of
American tort law.”).
191. Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am., Ltd., 987 A.2d 575, 589–90 (N.J. 2010).
192. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
193. See Nicastro, 987 A.2d at 591–94.
194. Id. at 591. See also supra note 166 for the Supreme Court’s analysis of the role of
“tradition” in the jurisdictional framework.
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American states; moreover, “foreign manufacturers, plying overseas
markets, should be covered by insurance . . . providing a fund for
consumers who may be injured by their products.” 195 Thus, the court found
that the exercise of jurisdiction against J. McIntyre in New Jersey was
neither inconvenient nor unfair.196
Of course, airplanes and insurance existed in 1945 when International
Shoe was decided, and the facts of Nicastro’s case did not implicate
technological concerns that Justice Stone could not have envisioned when
he wrote International Shoe. 197 Nonetheless, in a concurring opinion in
Nicastro, Justice Breyer took the state court’s theory seriously, if not the
application of it. 198 Summoning the specter of the internet, Justice Breyer
speculated that the plurality’s strict reliance on “submi[ssion] to the power
of a sovereign” and a defendant’s having “targeted the forum” might lead to
unfair results if sellers of products in an ever-shrinking world could insulate
themselves from suit simply by doing business exclusively through internet
distributors, and never in person. 199
In the end, Justice Breyer determined that Kennedy’s minimum contacts
analysis 200 was too narrow, while the New Jersey Supreme Court’s was too
broad. 201 Noting that only one of J. McIntyre’s machines had been
conclusively proven to have reached New Jersey, 202 Justice Breyer felt that
the case could nevertheless be decided simply as a matter of precedent.203
Justice Breyer did not address the Court’s prior holding that a state has an
interest in regulating tortious or harmful conduct, and may constitutionally
exercise jurisdiction based upon the sale of just one item within its

195. Nicastro, 987 A.2d at 591.
196. Id. at 591–92.
197. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2791 (2011) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (“[T]here have been many recent changes in commerce and communication,
many of which are not anticipated by our precedents. But this case does not present any of
those issues.”).
198. See id. at 2793.
199. See id. Though the Supreme Court has yet to hear a case on internet personal
jurisdiction, the issue is by no means new. Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com,
Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997), is the “seminal authority regarding personal
jurisdiction based upon the operation of an Internet web site.” Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Step
Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 452 (3d Cir. 2003). In Zippo, the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania adopted a “sliding scale” that anticipated Breyer’s
concerns. Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124. The scale took into account “the nature and quality
of commercial activity that an entity conducts over the Internet.” Id. The opinion goes on to
describe three different points on the scale on which jurisdiction would be proper, improper,
and factually dependent. Id. This analysis is beyond the scope of this Note. But courts have
already addressed Breyer’s technological concerns about the internet, with a model not
unlike Stevens’s balancing test in Asahi. Compare Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124, with Asahi
Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 122 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).
200. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
201. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2793 (Breyer, J., concurring).
202. Id. at 2792.
203. Id. (“None of our precedents finds that a single isolated sale, even if accompanied by
the kind of sales effort indicated here, is sufficient [to establish jurisdiction].”).
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borders. 204 In McGee, the defendant had directly solicited the purchase of
an insurance policy from the plaintiff, who lived in the forum, while in
Nicastro, the machine wound up in the forum through an intermediary. But
rather than assessing whether an international distribution scheme made
Nicastro analogous to, or distinguishable from, McGee, 205 Justice Breyer
looked to Asahi as the governing precedential authority. 206 Without
deciding which test was the better one, he concluded that, under either
O’Connor’s or Brennan’s Asahi rubric, there was no way J. McIntyre could
have reasonably foreseen being haled into New Jersey state court when only
one of its machines actually wound up there.207 Like Justice Kennedy,
Justice Breyer sought to protect very small manufacturers and sellers,208
and therefore found that Asahi governed this case, and that there simply
were not enough contacts to establish personal jurisdiction over J.
McIntyre. 209
E. Initial Interpretations of Nicastro
Trial courts have had to consider the implications of Nicastro when a
dangerous product, such as a forklift, allegedly causes an injury. 210 In
doing so, trial courts have found the precedential weight of Nicastro to be
limited. Because Nicastro was decided by a plurality, it has been applied
only on its most narrowly decided grounds: that is, a strict reliance on
Breyer’s concurrence and the precedential weight of the Asahi opinion. 211
But in Nicastro, Justice Breyer had applied Asahi without declaring
whether the stream of commerce “plus” test or Brennan’s foreseeability test
was appropriate. 212 Therefore, if Nicastro’s only jurisprudential relevance
is to be extracted from Breyer’s concurrence, very little has changed.
204. McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957); see also supra notes 56–62
and accompanying text.
205. When an alien corporation sells its products to a U.S. distributor and says, “sell these
where you will,” there is at least some question as to whether the corporation has solicited all
fifty states generally. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
206. This is an interesting maneuver, given that Asahi concerned the sale not of a single
good to a forum through a domestic distributor, but of several thousand component parts to a
forum through an alien manufacturer. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480
U.S. 102, 121 n.4 (1987).
207. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2792. Using foreseeability of litigation as a jurisdictional test
has been criticized by scholars as circular. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
208. Whereas Justice Kennedy feared that local Floridian farmers would be imperiled by
a contrary result in Nicastro, see supra note 173 and accompanying text, Breyer indicated
that upholding jurisdiction based upon a single sale could force an “Egyptian shirt maker”
and a “Kenyan coffee farmer” who used international distributors to “respond to productsliability tort suits in virtually every State in the United States,” Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2794
(Breyer, J., concurring).
209. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2792 (plurality opinion).
210. E.g., Ainsworth v. Cargotec USA, Inc., No. 2:10-CV-236, 2011 WL 6291812, at *1
(S.D. Miss. Dec. 15, 2011) (wrongful death action in which the plaintiff had been struck and
killed by the forklift); Lindsey v. Cargotec USA, Inc., No. 4:09-CV-00071, 2011 WL
4587583, at *1 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 30, 2011) (the plaintiff’s leg was run over by a forklift that
was alleged to have been negligently designed).
211. Ainsworth, 2011 WL 6291812, at *2; Lindsey, 2011 WL 4587583, at *7.
212. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
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Lower courts can continue to decide personal jurisdiction cases based on
whichever Asahi test they prefer. 213 If that is the state of the law today, 214
then J. McIntyre—and all alien corporations—continue under the
uncertainty of the old regime. 215
III. A MISSED OPPORTUNITY: HOW THE SUPREME COURT FAILED TO GIVE
ROBERT NICASTRO JUSTICE
As discussed in Parts I and II, modern jurisdictional doctrine is grounded
in a variety of different concepts. This part argues that the breadth of
personal jurisdiction’s doctrinal underpinnings presents trial courts with the
opportunity to achieve more just results.
This part begins by demonstrating the problems that result if the plurality
opinions in Asahi and Nicastro are given continued precedential effect.
Then, mindful of the fact that the exercise of jurisdiction must be fair and
just, this part proposes a new test grounded in tort law, a field well
acquainted with balancing the interests of society against the interests of
litigants to achieve just results.
Part III is meant to demonstrate that no jurisdictional test is perfect.
There will always be close cases, where the exercise of jurisdiction may or
may not be fair depending on who is being asked. Close cases undoubtedly
pose difficult questions—but the fact that questions are difficult does not
diminish their relevance to the litigants.
A. As Precedent, Asahi and Nicastro Are Problematic
Relying on Asahi to decide jurisdictional cases with respect to alien
defendants would cause significant problems going forward. First, WorldWide Volkswagen held that fairness dictates that defendants be able to
reasonably anticipate being haled into a forum to make jurisdiction
proper. 216 But different circuits have interpreted Asahi and Nicastro in

213. See Lindsey, 2011 WL 4587583, at *12 n.6 (noting that after Nicastro, trial courts
may continue to apply whichever Asahi test is still precedential authority in their circuit); see
also supra note 151 and accompanying text.
214. The Supreme Court has endorsed the “narrowest grounds” theory with respect to the
application of plurality opinions. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)
(citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)). But that raises the question: By
what metric is Breyer’s (or any) concurrence decided on the narrowest grounds available?
See United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 63–65 (1st Cir. 2006) (observing that the
narrowest grounds are often difficult to discern, and are dependent on the facts of a given
case); see also Kimura, supra note 151, at 1604 (noting that the “narrowest grounds model is
inconsistent with the principle of majoritarianism” and has not been satisfactorily explicated
by the Supreme Court).
215. Arguably, if the “narrowest grounds” are to be used in construing the precedential
authority of plurality opinions, Stevens’s Asahi concurrence should be given weight going
forward. In declining to create and apply an expansive view of the stream of commerce
doctrine, Justice Stevens proposed a fairness-based model that would allow courts to make a
case-by-case determination of jurisdiction. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480
U.S. 102, 121–22 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring).
216. See supra notes 91–93 and accompanying text.
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different ways. 217 Surely the lesson of World-Wide Volkswagen is not that
alien corporations should expect to be haled into courts in certain states
strictly because of the jurisdictional approach of the circuit in which that
state sits. Such a scheme would disadvantage small corporations who wish
to do business in the United States, but do not have the time or resources to
pore over every circuit’s personal jurisdiction case law, hoping to determine
which (if any) part of Asahi that circuit has decided to follow. 218
Moreover, the facts of Asahi endow it with dubious precedential
authority. Asahi was about resolving a third-party claim against a
manufacturer of component parts.219 The Court’s reasoning focused on
how jurisdiction would offend fair play and substantial justice given that set
of facts. 220 But, as J. McIntyre demonstrated, a corporation can take
significant steps to market its product throughout the United States, derive
substantial benefit therefrom, and still be insulated from jurisdiction based
on the rigidity of O’Connor’s test. 221
On the opposite side of the spectrum, Brennan’s test could leave orange
growers 222 and shirt makers 223 alike accountable to suit whenever their
goods find their way to a distant forum. 224 Jurisdiction over such
entrepreneurs of limited resources might restrain both domestic and
international trade, and would therefore be undesirable as a matter of
policy. 225
Nobody can agree on the appropriate test, 226 but Stevens’s Asahi
concurrence seems to at least result in the desired answers to everyone’s
hypotheticals. If jurisdiction was premised upon the hazardous nature of
goods getting shipped across state and international boundaries, 227 neither
Kennedy’s farmer nor Breyer’s shirt maker would be subject to
unreasonable jurisdiction. Oranges are not generally dangerous.228 Neither
are shirts. 229 Clearly, one man who sells a crate of oranges to a local
217. See supra notes 146–47, 211–13 and accompanying text.
218. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
219. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
220. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
221. For a counter to O’Connor’s test, see supra note 175 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 167–72 and accompanying text.
223. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
224. See supra note 137.
225. See supra notes 122–29 and accompanying text.
226. See supra Part I.C.4.
227. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
228. See J.W.B. v. State, 419 So. 2d 407, 409 (Fla Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (hurled oranges
do not generally cause death or great bodily harm).
229. Fruit does get poisoned sometimes. And shirts are occasionally made out of
flammable material due to negligent design. See Smith v. J.C. Penney Co., 525 P.2d 1299,
1301, 1305–06 (Or. 1974). But one must step back and ask reasonable, fair questions.
Which is more important: that orange growers exercise care to make sure their fruits do not
poison Alaskans, or that airplane manufacturers exercise care to make sure that their planes
do not fall apart in the air? Between these two extremes, there will be close cases, where the
product in question is of a moderately dangerous nature, and a court must evaluate the
propriety of holding a manufacturer of such a product subject to jurisdiction. But courts are
intimately familiar with this sort of balancing test, and are well suited to settle the issue
through the evolution of common law. See infra Part III.C.1.
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distributor should not be subject to nationwide jurisdiction, even if one
orange winds up in each of the fifty states. The benefit to the seller and the
risk to society are simply too slight. On the other hand, when a corporation
produces massive metal-shearing machines, and sells as many of them as
possible for tens of thousands of dollars, 230 the benefit to the seller and
concomitant risk to the eventual market each go up substantially. 231 How
dangerous must the good be? How much benefit is enough to make
jurisdiction appropriate? The lower courts are ready, willing, and able to
supply competent answers to these very questions.232
After all, courts have been unable to agree on the proper jurisdictional
bedrock in these types of cases, or from what source that foundation is
derived. 233 Initially, residents of separate states were protected from suits
elsewhere as a means of honoring the Full Faith and Credit Clause while
still safeguarding state sovereignty. 234 But interstate federalism no longer
carries much water as a jurisdictional principle, and has even been
discarded in recent decades. 235 The best argument for the primacy of
sovereignty in jurisdictional cases is that “the ‘fairness’ assured the
defendant by the due process clause presupposes adjudication of the
defendant’s substantive rights by a legitimate sovereign.” 236 But this
proposition produces a chicken-and-egg problem.
Does legitimate
sovereignty beget fair decisions? Or is fairness a prerequisite to legitimate
sovereignty?
Finding state courts hamstrung by the rigidity of a corporate presence
requirement, the Supreme Court grounded jurisdiction in a theory of
“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”237 Fairness has
been defined as emanating from a number of sources, including a state’s
regulatory interest, 238 a defendant’s purposeful availment of a forum,239
holistic case-by-case analyses, 240 and federalism concerns. 241
In some instances, it is permissible for state courts to assert jurisdiction
over alien corporations that shipped goods into the forum. 242 But the
230. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
231. Standing in the way of this reasonable analysis is World-Wide Volkswagen’s position
that a “dangerous instrumentality” test is not sufficient to convey jurisdiction upon a state.
See supra note 143. But it is not merely the dangerous nature of the good in question that
controls. Because volume and value must also be considered, Stevens’s test is not expressly
forbidden by World-Wide Volkswagen. See supra note 143.
232. See infra Part III.C.
233. See supra Part I.C.
234. See supra notes 30–37 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 11, 89 and accompanying text.
236. Murphy, supra note 149, at 291; see also Fitzsimmons v. Barton, 589 F.2d 330, 333
(7th Cir. 1979) (“[T]he ‘fairness’ standard . . . relates to the fairness of the exercise of power
by a particular sovereign, not the fairness of imposing the burdens of litigating in a distant
forum.”).
237. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 40, 55–59 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 65–68 and accompanying text.
240. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
241. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
242. See supra Part I.C.
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specific situations under which such exercises are legitimate are still subject
to substantial debate. 243 With the doctrine still unsettled, the Supreme
Court was free to approach Nicastro’s case holistically but declined to do
so. 244 In so declining, the Court neglected to ask itself the beguilingly
simple question that should have controlled the case: given this unique set
of facts, what would be the traditionally fair jurisdictional result?245
Despite this omission, Nicastro’s applicability appears to be limited.246
Courts may therefore achieve just results based upon the diverse fact
patterns that international products liability cases present.
The accident that befell Robert Nicastro represented an unfair lot in life.
The pain and suffering that attends the loss of four digits to a saw’s blade is
unimaginable to the full-fingered among us. 247 But is it also fundamentally
unfair to force J. McIntyre to defend itself in the state in which the injury
occurred, instead of the places where J. McIntyre actually entered into
contracts or delivered the machines? 248 In a jurisdictional sense, that very
same question might be phrased: when Robert Nicastro’s claim against J.
McIntyre is adjudicated in New Jersey, has J. McIntyre received due
process? The answer to that question lies in the one jurisdictional precept
that the Court has consistently applied over the last seventy years: an
exercise of jurisdiction must comport with “traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.” 249
B. Filling the Void with Fairness
Assuming that it is the Due Process Clause that insulates foreign
defendants from suits in state courts,250 it is essential to know what process
is traditionally and fairly due.
The Supreme Court’s precedent
demonstrates that such conclusions may be drawn only by balancing
individual liberty against state interests:
Due process has not been reduced to any formula; its content cannot be
determined by reference to any code. . . . [T]hrough the course of this

243. See supra Part I.C.4.
244. See supra notes 179–84 and accompanying text.
245. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. The dissent did attempt to arrive at the
right result through a holistic understanding of the case. See supra notes 179–84 and
accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 211–12 and accompanying text.
247. It is often the province of juries to imagine the unimaginable when computing
damage awards. The case of Robert Nicastro would have been no different had it reached
trial and a verdict been rendered for the plaintiff. Compare, e.g., Murphy v. L & J Press
Corp., 472 F. Supp. 411, 413 (E.D. Mo. 1979) (holding that a damages award of one million
dollars to a plaintiff who had lost four fingers was excessive), with Burnett v. Mackworth G.
Rees, Inc., 311 N.W.2d 417, 420 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (finding that a damages award of
over one million dollars to a plaintiff who had lost four fingers was not excessive because it
did not “shock the judicial conscience”).
248. See supra notes 176, 178 and accompanying text.
249. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
250. Although this is the rule emphatically announced in Pennoyer v. Neff, it is still open
for debate whether, after International Shoe, due process is still the bedrock of jurisdictional
doctrine. See supra notes 33–36, 47 and accompanying text.
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Court’s decisions it has represented the balance which our Nation, built
upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the individual, has struck
between that liberty and the demands of organized society. 251

Essentially, a state’s regulatory interest 252 may be considered, using
“careful scrutiny,” to determine whether a defendant’s right to due process
has been afforded traditional protection.253
International Shoe therefore correctly identified traditional fairness as the
sine qua non of due process. 254 Determining what is fair enough to
comport with due process, much like determining what processes are
traditional, 255 requires balancing a state’s regulatory interest against
individual liberties.256 Standards of fairness, however, necessarily evolve
over time, as judicial decisions adapt to the conceptions of the day. 257 In a
global economy, where a manufacturer produces machines hoping to sell
them in as many places as possible,258 it is not unfair to subject that
manufacturer to suit in a place where it hopes, but does not necessarily
anticipate, to do business.259
C. A Tort-Based Analysis Provides a New Test
This section explores why the motivating ideas behind certain classic
common law torts are also applicable to personal jurisdiction, which can
itself be seen as a matter of common law. 260 It proceeds to analyze
jurisdiction by examining classic tort concepts (products liability,
transferred intent, and causation) and applying their modes of analysis to
jurisdictional questions. This model of analysis is intended to demonstrate
that courts will not be lost without a talismanic jurisdictional precept, 261
and are quite capable of achieving equitable jurisdictional results.

251. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 501 (1977) (quoting Poe v. Ullman,
367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
252. See supra notes 47, 62 and accompanying text.
253. Moore, 431 U.S. at 502 (quoting Poe, 367 U.S. at 542) (Harlan, J., dissenting). But
see supra note 54 and accompanying text.
254. See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24–25 (1981).
255. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
256. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 24–25 (Because “‘due process’ . . . can never be[] precisely
defined[,] . . . [a]pplying the Due Process Clause is . . . an uncertain enterprise which must
discover what ‘fundamental fairness’ consists of in a particular situation by first considering
any relevant precedents and then by assessing the several interests that are at stake.”).
257. See Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)
(“‘[D]ue process’ . . . is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time,
place and circumstances. It is compounded of history, reason, the past course of decisions.”
(quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 160 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring))). With respect to personal jurisdiction, it appears that WorldWide Volkswagen has come the closest to defining a jurisdictional balancing test that
comports with traditional notions of fair play. See supra note 15.
258. See infra note 299 and accompanying text.
259. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 23–29 and accompanying text.
261. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
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1. Why Classic Tort Law—and Therefore a State’s Regulatory Interest—Is
an Appropriate Bedrock of Fairness
in International Products Liability Claims
Because the doctrine of personal jurisdiction remains unsettled, trial
courts still find themselves free to choose which jurisdictional model they
implement. 262 In its earliest form, personal jurisdiction was a corollary of
international law. 263 As a nascent doctrine, it protected out-of-state
defendants from a broad reading of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 264 It
became a constitutional principle when the Court came to fear that the state
might exert physical power against unresponsive defendants, thereby
depriving them of their liberty. 265 This principle weakened as forms of
exerting adjudicatory power became antiquated. 266 Furthermore, corporate
presence in a given forum became challenging to define with precision,
necessitating a case-by-case inquiry. 267 Today, the various iterations of the
stream-of-commerce test have come to govern cases against corporate
defendants, like Robert Nicastro’s. 268 Essentially, after two centuries of
doctrinal development, jurists still do not agree about why the doctrine
exists. The only tenet approaching unanimity is that the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over a defendant has to be fair. 269
But what does fairness require in an international marketplace, where
goods often land in unforeseeable forums? A court’s adjudicatory power, at
its most nefarious extreme, represents an impingement on a defendant’s
liberty interest. The subsequent lawsuit threatens to deprive the defendant
of her property. And the applicable tort law in the resulting litigation will
often ascribe liability to people whose actions give rise to unintended or
unforeseeable consequences. 270 Nonetheless, it is fair to hold these people
liable, and thereby deprive them of their property, in order to regulate
society’s conduct in the future. There is no due process violation when one
is held liable for throwing a stick at a person, missing, and hitting someone
who was not within his vision. 271 These are results that have been intuited
as fair, and they have become acceptable to courts and citizens alike. 272
In determining whether an exercise of personal jurisdiction comports
with due process, courts can use similar balancing tests to those that they
have used to determine whether such an exercise is traditionally fair. After
all, the goal of tort law is to arrive at a fair and just result by “appropriately
balanc[ing] the implicated public policies and the autonomy of the

262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

See supra notes 211–13 and accompanying text.
See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text.
See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 48–50 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 135–41, 211–13 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 47, 254 and accompanying text.
See infra Part III.C.2.b.
See infra note 300 and accompanying text.
See infra Part III.C.2.b.
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tortfeasor.” 273 A tort-based test will enable courts to conduct the “claimspecific” 274 analyses that Justices Stevens and Ginsburg have called for.275
By focusing on the specific details of each case, courts will be able to avoid
anomalous and unfair results yielded by strict doctrines.276 Moreover,
courts have already become comfortable applying tort law principles to the
question of whether a cause of action is related to the defendant’s contacts
with the forum. 277
Assume for a moment that jurisdiction had not been contested in
Nicastro. Barring a settlement, at the end of the trial the jury would have
been confronted with a products liability case. Although the metal-shearing
machine had been adrift in the stream of commerce for a period of time, the
negligence that caused the alleged defect could not have any harmful
consequences until that machine came to rest, was purchased, and used for
its intended purpose—here, cutting metal at a plant, which happened to be
located in New Jersey. 278
The allegations in Nicastro’s complaint, if proven to a jury’s satisfaction,
would have likely been sufficient to result in tort liability. But why is this
fair? For now, let it suffice to say that, if liability in tort were ascribed to
the defendant based on the facts in Nicastro, the defendant would be
deprived of its property. But there would be no constitutional problem
because due process would have been given. 279
When jurisdiction, and not liability, is asserted based on these same facts,
thereby impinging upon the defendant’s individual liberty interest,280 due
process is not violated. The defendant’s liberty has been adequately
balanced against the state’s interest in regulating the production and
distribution of hazardous materials.281

273. Stein, supra note 9, at 691.
274. Floyd & Baradaran-Robison, supra note 110, at 652 (noting that “claim-specific”
analysis is appropriate “because the geographic locus of the harm that the law seeks to
prevent may vary depending on the type of claim for relief that the plaintiff asserts”).
275. See supra notes 143, 180 and accompanying text.
276. Cf. supra note 131 and accompanying text.
277. See Note, No Bad Puns: A Different Approach to the Problem of Personal
Jurisdiction and the Internet, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1821, 1838–41 (2003) (reciting cases that
apply “but-for” and “proximate cause” tests in resolving whether the cause of action arises
from, or relates to, the defendant’s contact with the forum). For a discussion of the “arise
from or relate to” test, see Mark M. Maloney, Specific Personal Jurisdiction and the “Arise
from or Relate to” Requirement . . . What Does It Mean?, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1265,
1269–72 (1993).
278. See supra notes 153–54 and accompanying text.
279. Apart from the jurisdictional inquiry, due process will be given when a defendant
has both notice of the litigation and an opportunity to be heard. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
U.S. 67, 80 (1972).
280. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
281. See supra notes 11, 169 and accompanying text. But see Dessem, supra note 95, at
76–77 (noting that the hazardous nature of products in both the jurisdictional phase and the
liability phase of a trial subjects defendants to a “type of ‘double counting’ disapproved by
the Supreme Court in the first amendment context” (quoting Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783,
790 (1984))).
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2. Which Tort Laws Are Appropriate Models for Jurisdictional Questions
in International Products Liability Claims?
a. Products Liability Law
The generally accepted principle that a plaintiff who is unknown to a
corporate defendant may recover in a products liability suit was not always
settled law. In the nineteenth century, privity of contract between the
manufacturer and user of the product was generally required to establish
liability. 282 Judge Cardozo, however, recognized that when substantial
danger is likely to result from negligent design or assembly of a given
product, a contract-based theory of products liability was insufficient to
protect users from undue harm. 283
Cardozo’s theory, now widely accepted, 284 is that the state’s regulatory
interest in ensuring that potentially dangerous goods are produced with
care 285 supersedes the defendant’s interest in not being sued by a previously
unknown plaintiff with whom it had not been in contractual privity. 286 If a
state’s interest in carefully manufactured goods is sufficient to expose a
defendant to liability and thereby deprive it of its property, 287 even when
the defendant had no contact with the plaintiff, the state interest may justify
an impingement of an alien corporation’s liberty interest—even when it has
not given consent to be sued in a given forum where its products wind
up. 288 This conclusion fits with Stevens’s suggestion to consider the state’s
interest in regulating trade in hazardous products.289
“‘[T]raditional notions of fair play and substantial justice’ can be as
readily offended by the perpetuation of ancient forms that are no longer
justified as by the adoption of new procedures that are inconsistent with the
basic values of our constitutional heritage.” 290 When Judge Cardozo
extended the law of liability in MacPherson, he recognized that ancient
282. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1055–57 (N.Y. 1916) (Bartlett,
C.J., dissenting).
283. See id. at 1053 (majority opinion).
284. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440–42 (Cal. 1944)
(Traynor, J., concurring).
285. MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1051 (“Because the danger is to be foreseen, there is a
duty to avoid the injury.”). Rejecting the argument that only “imminently dangerous” things
such as “explosives [and] deadly weapons” should trigger liability absent privity, Judge
Cardozo stressed that manufacturers should be held to a duty of care “[i]f the nature of a
thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently
made.” Id. at 1053.
286. See Escola, 150 P.2d at 440–41 (Traynor, J., concurring).
287. Justice Holmes had long been a proponent of using tort law as a means to achieve
regulatory ends; when Cardozo discarded the privity rule, he arguably brought the law of
products liability in line with Holmes’s vision of law as regulation. See John C.P. Goldberg
& Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of MacPherson, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1733, 1754, 1768
(1998).
288. This conclusion squares with International Shoe’s abandonment of the theory of
implied corporate consent in favor of a standard that upholds jurisdiction based on the
impact of the corporation’s conduct. See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text.
289. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
290. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977).
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forms had left too many injuries uncompensated. Because, after Nicastro,
the old jurisdictional tests have become problematic and inconsistently
applied, 291 because the old tests are unfair to plaintiffs in alien products
liability cases, 292 and because the negative foreign policy implications of
asserting jurisdiction over alien corporations are debatable,293 a new model
that focuses on where the dangerous goods are meant to be used, rather than
sold, should be adopted. The ancient form of jurisdictional “privity”294
should be discarded in favor of a more just model. 295 Cardozo has given us
the first element of a new test: Was the alien corporation hoping and
prepared to serve a national market on its own initiative?
b. Transferred Intent as Purposeful Availment
One may now reasonably object: even assuming a strong state interest in
regulation of dangerous goods, it is nevertheless an unfair deprivation of
due process to subject a defendant to jurisdiction when it has not
purposefully availed itself of the privileges and immunities of doing
business in the forum state. 296 While this is true, it fails to tell the whole
story with respect to the facts of the Nicastro case. J. McIntyre had
produced and sent a dangerous product 297 to a large geographical area, the
boundaries of which were irrelevant 298 to the final goal—selling the
product. 299
Such conduct is valid to establish liability over defendants in simple tort
cases. In one famous case, a defendant threw a stick at someone within a
crowd; the stick hit another person whom the defendant had not seen, and
was still liable for battery. 300 It cannot be said that the defendant in this
case purposefully directed the stick toward the plaintiff. Nonetheless, he
was compelled to give up his property to compensate the person he had
injured.

291. See supra notes 92, 213 and accompanying text.
292. See supra Part II.C.
293. See supra notes 128–31 and accompanying text.
294. See supra notes 282–86 and accompanying text.
295. When old doctrines become obsolete, cases like MacPherson are useful (and perhaps
necessary) to move the law in a direction more suited to achieving beneficial ends through
regulation. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 287, at 1845–46. Arguably, notions of due
process that overprotect individual rights at the expense of state regulatory ends are as
outmoded as the notion of privity that MacPherson discarded. See id. at 1842–46.
296. See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text.
297. See supra note 165.
298. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
299. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2796 (2011) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (quoting J. McIntyre’s president, who had said “[a]ll we wish to do is sell our
products in the [United] States—and get paid!”).
300. Talmage v. Smith, 59 N.W. 656, 657 (Mich. 1894) (“The right of the plaintiff to
recover . . . depend[s] upon an intention on the part of the defendant to hit somebody, and to
inflict an unwarranted injury upon some one. Under these circumstances, the fact that the
injury resulted to another than was intended does not relieve the defendant from
responsibility.”); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 16 cmt. a (1965).
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Much in the same manner, J. McIntyre did not purposefully direct its
machine toward New Jersey. J. McIntyre did, however, direct its wares
toward the national market—essentially, a crowd—of which New Jersey
was a member. 301 The machine was sent to Ohio; from there, it might have
been launched into any state where McIntyre America could find a
buyer. 302 Given the size of New Jersey’s scrap metal market, 303 it was
altogether possible that, even if J. McIntyre did not aim the machine at New
Jersey, it might nonetheless “hit” someone there.304 Just as fairness and
due process permit a plaintiff to recover from a defendant who never
wished to hurt him, due process permits a state to exercise jurisdiction over
a defendant who purposefully directed potentially dangerous goods at a
large area without explicitly stating an intention to serve particular states
within that area.
Transferred intent applies only to intentional torts, but in the
jurisdictional context, the purposeful availment of a forum is the relevant
intent. And that availment, when directed from abroad at a generalized
location, may be transferred when predictable harm results.305 Imagine that
a mad scientist in Glasgow set up a long-range rocket launcher in his
backyard. If he were to negligently handle the launcher, and his rocket
traversed the Atlantic and caused harm in Kansas, he cannot be heard to
complain that he could not have foreseen litigation in Topeka. A rocket
launcher is dangerous; long-range rockets may land anywhere, even though
it cannot be said precisely where.
As a jurisdictional matter, there is little difference between this scientist
and J. McIntyre. Each constructed a dangerous product that might cause
harm in some unidentified location. Neither should be allowed to back out
if their constructions are alleged to cause harm in an unforeseen forum. The
second element of the new test thus becomes clear: Did the alien
corporation send a potentially hazardous product to a general area of which
the forum state was a foreseeable member?
c. Negligence “at Rest”
In 1919, a young lady was let off a train approximately a mile past her
intended stop, a mishap occasioned by the negligence of the railroad on
which she traveled. 306 Soon after she got off the train and began to walk
back to her intended destination, the lady was raped.307 The Supreme Court

301.
302.
303.
304.

See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
See supra note 299 and accompanying text.
See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 1 cmt. b (2010) (“[S]o long as the injury to the actual victim arises from the risks
that made the actor’s conduct tortious, that harm can be deemed within the scope of the
actor’s liability.”).
305. See supra notes 143, 228–29.
306. See Hines v. Garrett, 108 S.E. 690, 691 (Va. 1921).
307. See id. at 691–92.
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of Appeals of Virginia held that the railroad’s negligence proximately
caused the misfortune she suffered. 308
Nineteen years before this incident, a different woman was let off a train
one stop past her destination, also through the negligence of the railroad.309
But in that case, the conductor escorted the passenger to a hotel room. That
night, a kerosene lamp exploded in the room and caused her hands to be
badly burned. 310 There, because the conductor had taken the plaintiff to a
place at which his negligence could no longer be the foreseeable cause of
the injury suffered, the Supreme Court of Georgia found that the railroad’s
negligence was not a proximate cause of the injury suffered.311
The difference between the foregoing cases is intuitively clear. In the
former, the railroad’s negligence was still at work when harm befell the
woman. The very type of harm that a mistaken drop-off tends to cause was
still in the air—that of a traumatic assault in an unfamiliar area. 312 In the
latter case, however, the railroad’s negligence was at rest. Being dropped
off at the wrong station does not tend to cause one’s hands to be burned by
a kerosene lamp. 313
But how does this matter in a jurisdictional sense? It is a question of the
type of harm a negligently designed product tends to cause. A scrap metal
machine cannot cause its usual sort of foreseeable harm until it arrives at
the sort of place where its blades are set spinning. The machine is not
likely to do harm while sitting in an Ohio warehouse waiting to be shipped.
And until it begins shearing metal, it cannot possibly inflict the sort of harm
that Nicastro suffered. In a common case like this, the machine’s arrival in
the forum precedes its activation. In other words, the foreseeability
question—whether J. McIntyre could reasonably anticipate being haled into
court in a given forum—is not “at rest” until the machine starts shearing.
Kennedy’s belief that J. McIntyre is rightly subject to suit in Ohio when its
machines can only cause harm in New Jersey (or any state of initial use) 314
is misplaced. While the machine waits in Ohio, the locus of potential
jurisdictional sites is still “in the air”; the machine is not yet in a place
where it might conceivably do harm. This provides the third and final
element of a jurisdictional test in such cases: Could the defendant’s alleged

308. Id. at 693–94 (“The precise injury need not have been anticipated. It is enough if the
act is such that the party ought to have anticipated that it was liable to result in injury to
others.” (internal citations omitted)).
309. See Cent. of Ga. Ry. v. Price, 32 S.E. 77, 77 (Ga. 1898).
310. See id.
311. Id. at 77–78.
312. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Intervening Wrongdoing in Tort:
The Restatement (Third)’s Unfortunate Embrace of Negligent Enabling, 44 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 1211, 1238–40 (2009) (arguing that the result in Hines was justified because railroads
and carriers are expected to bring customers to their destination, and are therefore subject to
a heightened standard of liability when they fail to meet the goal of safe arrival).
313. See Mark F. Grady, Proximate Cause and the Law of Negligence, 69 IOWA L. REV.
363, 438–39 (1984).
314. See supra notes 175–76 and accompanying text.
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misconduct have caused the plaintiff harm in any other forum? 315 If not,
jurisdiction in the state where the harm occurred should be proper.
CONCLUSION
In a separate opinion in International Shoe, Justice Black said that he
could not settle jurisdictional precepts on the Court’s notion of “‘fair play,’
however appealing that term may be.” 316 But after decades of confusion,
difficulty, and dissonant voices in the field of personal jurisdiction, it
appears that little else is left.
There will be times when a court is confronted with a situation where the
fair result is not clear; where it must struggle to balance the equities, and
perhaps even come up with a result that the litigants could not have
foreseen. 317 But Robert Nicastro probably could not have foreseen coming
in to work on October 11, 2001, and leaving with four fewer fingers than he
had when he awoke. Less could he have foreseen that he might have had to
sue for redress not in the state where the tort happened, but in England, or
more incomprehensibly, Ohio, simply because of some obscure doctrine,
unknown to most tort victims, and too incoherent to be fully comprehended
by sophisticated corporations.
Courts that attempt to apply fair and just jurisdictional standards often
look to hypotheticals to justify their chosen rules.318 In dreaming up unfair
consequences to imagined litigants, the Supreme Court has applied
jurisdictional rules to tort victims with regard only to how their rules apply
on the margins. 319 But in resorting to such hypotheticals, the Court stands
to ignore the most compelling fact patterns of all—the cases that actually sit
before it. This Note’s proposed test would give courts the flexibility to
consider particularized harm to particularized litigants without being unduly
burdensome to alien corporations. Such a rule might, on occasion, expose
these corporations to jurisdiction in cases that might not have met the
plurality’s standards in Nicastro or Asahi. But that is simply a reasonable
price of selling hazardous materials to U.S. consumers and businesses.
Shirt makers and orange growers will not be exposed to additional liability
under the proposed rule because of the less harmful nature of their products.
But corporations who sell large, dangerous machines will be. And if J.
McIntyre had deemed this too great a price to pay for the opportunity to do
business in the United States, Robert Nicastro might still have a full right
hand. Jurisdictional questions aside, that might have been the fairest
outcome of all.
315. This element of the proposed test is reconcilable with the Court’s finding that there
was no jurisdiction in World-Wide Volkswagen and Hanson v. Denckla. Unilateral bordercrossing by plaintiffs may defeat jurisdiction because the harm could have occurred in the
state of origination. See supra notes 68, 96 and accompanying text.
316. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 325 (1945) (opinion of Black, J.).
317. The Court in International Shoe arrived at just such a result. See supra note 92 and
accompanying text.
318. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
319. See supra notes 173, 208 and accompanying text.

